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The first chapter of this dissertation investigates the consequences of the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). While the law has been in
effect since 1986, this chapter is the first study of the law by an economist that this
author has been able to find. I find that the medical insurance rate would have
increased without passage of this law.
The second chapter of this dissertation considers the tax subsidy of medical
insurance in the United States. Employer-provided medical insurance is exempt
from income taxes. Previous studies have focused on how this subsidy effects the
average likelihood of having insurance. The innovation of this chapter is to estimate
the actual number of workers who would drop insurance coverage were the tax
subsidy be removed.
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The third chapter looks at a different kind of insurance—unemployment in-
surance. The generosity of unemployment insurance varies greatly across countries,
and even across time within the United States. The third chapter attempts to un-
derstand these differences, and in doing so, estimates an important parameter of the
labor-search literature.
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Chapter 1
Bankruptcy, Medical Insurance
and a Law with Unintended
Consequences
Two potentially related empirical phenomena have recently perplexed economists.
The first is the rise of consumer bankruptcy in the US. The number of consumer
bankruptcies in the US has risen since the mid-1980s. This change has typically
been explained by changes in transaction costs, or decreased “stigma” associated
with bankruptcy.
At the same time, the number of workers with medical insurance has declined.
Cutler (2002) focuses on this decline in the late 1980s and 1990s. Cutler (2002)
finds that this is due entirely to the decline in the take-up rate of private medical
insurance. The proportion of full-time workers offered private medical insurance
from their employer over this period did not change, while an increasing proportion
of those who were offered insurance did not accept it.
In fact, this decline in the insurance rate seems to have begun in the mid-
1980s. As reported in Gruber and Poterba (1994a), the insured proportion of the
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employed population has decreased since 1986. These trends can be seen in Figure
1.1.
In 1986, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EM-
TALA) passed into law. Also known as the “Patient Anti-Dumping Law,” it guar-
anteed a standard of care to any person who showed up in a hospital’s emergency
room, independent of the person’s insurance status or ability to pay for medical
care.1 Before 1986, a hospital could turn away a patient if the patient was unable
to pay for care.
Unfortunately, as reported by the Government Accountability Office (2001),
there is no data on the incidence of “patient dumping.” However, the effect on
incentives is clear. Before 1986, medical insurance was one way to ensure medical
treatment. After 1986, a standard of care was guaranteed by law. Ipso facto,
private medical insurance becomes less valuable with EMTALA because bankruptcy
became a more agreeable substitute. If an uninsured individual suffers a costly
medical emergency, he or she is guaranteed a standard of care and can default on
the payment of medical bills.
This paper first examines these empirical phenomena—the declining insur-
ance rate and the increased number of consumer bankruptcies. Then, I introduce a
model that mixes the insurance choice with the default choice. This model is then
taken to medical expenditure data, in order to estimate the quantitative effects of
EMTALA. The final section concludes.
1If a hospital is found in violation of EMTALA, it could lose its payment agreements for Medicare
and Medicaid.
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1.1 Two Empirical Phenomena
1.1.1 Declining Insurance
The 1990s saw a large increase in medical costs, as described in Figure 1.6(a). At
the same time, the take-up rate of those workers offered private medical insurance
declined. Cutler (2002) finds that the rise in out-of-pocket (OOP) premia can ac-
count for the entire fall in take-up rates. This pattern is consistent with models of
adverse selection.
Low-income workers in the 1990s were much less likely to have medical in-
surance. Cutler (2002) suggests why this might be: “The alternatives that people
have—enrolling in public programs, receiving free care, or paying out of pocket—are
not equally attractive to everyone, particularly higher income people.”
Figure 1.1 demonstrates that the decline in insurance rates began in the
mid-1980s. In particular, there was a significant decrease around 1986. As Table
1.1 shows, low-income workers disproportionately shifted out of medical insurance
after 1986.
In 1986, there were several changes in federal law that could have affected
demand for medical insurance. The first was the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986.
While TRA decreased the top marginal income tax rate, TRA increased the marginal
tax rate on some low-income workers from 11% to 15%. Since compensation in the
form of insurance is tax-exempt, this made wage income more expensive for low-
income workers and medical benefits more attractive. Moreover, TRA extended
limited tax-exemptions to the self-employed, increasing the insured portion of the
self-employed. These changes mask larger decreases in insurance rates of the non-self
employed in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1.
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1986
is well-known among economists and the unemployed. COBRA gave workers the
right to purchase group insurance from their employers for a period of time after
3
they left their jobs or were fired. This should increase a household’s willingness to
pay for private medical insurance. After COBRA, having private medical insurance
included the option value of purchasing it in the event of job loss.
Also part of COBRA was EMTALA. EMTALA decreased the value of med-
ical insurance, by guaranteeing a standard of care in emergency rooms. Moreover,
the patterns of un-insurance described above fit the EMTALA story. The cost of
bankruptcy is likely to be much less for low-income households, as low-income house-
holds are less likely to hold assets and other property that could be forfeited in the
bankruptcy process. As can be expected, the distortions of EMTALA around 1986
were greatest among the low-income households.
1.1.2 The Rise in Bankruptcy
As Figure 1.2 shows, consumer bankruptcy has been on the rise in the US since the
mid-1980s. While the the number of consumer bankruptcies reflects some business
cycle variation, the trend is positive. Figure 1.2 also shows the number of business
bankruptcy filings. The number of business bankruptcies has remained relatively
constant over this period. While changes in financial frictions have been used to
explain the change in the consumer bankruptcy rate, it is not clear why these effects
would be asymmetric. Figure 1.2 suggests an asymmetric change in the bankruptcy
choices faced by consumers and businesses.2
It has been argued that a decline in the “stigma” of bankruptcy led to the
dramatic rise of consumer bankruptcy. Again, there is no a priori reason to think
that such a decline would only affect consumer bankruptcies. Further, as Sullivan,
Warren and Westbrook (2000) notes, non-response remains a large problem in col-
lecting survey data from recently bankrupted households, and does not vary in a
2The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also limited the flexibility of large banks to write off bad debt.
While no model of bankruptcy includes the tax incentives for lenders, this change would likely be
modeled as an increase in the transaction costs of debt.
4
way that suggests declining stigma. The response rate of bankrupt consumers was
nearly fifty percent for their 1991 study. The response rate for Western Texas was
ten percent higher than Northern California.
A more recent study, Jacoby, Sullivan and Warren (2001), focused on the role
of medical debt and bankruptcy. Twenty percent of the respondents from their 1991
study cited medical “causes” of their bankruptcy, rising to half of the bankrupted
consumers in their 1999 study. Two percent cited medical reasons in their 1981
study. Sullivan et al. (2000) report that the average and median income of their
bankrupt respondents decreased from 1981 to 1991. As shown above, low-income
households were more likely to have switched out of coverage.
Some of the most striking evidence in favor of EMTALA’s role is anecdotal.
The first is from the Government Accountability Office (2001), which studied the
effects of EMTALA for Congress. Doctors reported that EMTALA led to increased
use of emergency rooms, which was aggravated by the rising number of uninsured
patients. Further, the study noted, “EMTALA leads to on-call physicians providing
uncompensated care.”3
Jacoby et al. (2001) also finds evidence of strategic behavior in decisions of
debt and medicine:
“Anecdotally, we have heard from bankruptcy lawyers that debtors may
be reluctant to risk losing the services of their health care providers
and thus may try to find a way to pay them even if other creditors go
unpaid.”
Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2006) finds that the Canadian bankruptcy
rate demonstrates a similar pattern to that of the US. The Canadian bankruptcy
3Later the study states, almost suggestively, “Hospital and physician representatives also told
us that EMTALA has contributed to the increased use of emergency departments for the treatment
of nonurgent conditions and a decline in physicians willingness to provide on-call services to emer-
gency departments. However, other factors, such as the increase in the number of uninsured, also
contribute to these changes and it is difficult to determine how much is due to EMTALA.”
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rate serves as a control group for their research. The Canadian legal and credit
market institutions are similar to those of the US. Since medical care is socialized in
Canada, similar growth rates cannot be explained by increased exogenous medical
risk in both countries. This similarity does not begin until the early- to mid-1990s.
The bankruptcy rate in Canada experiences a shallow trough in the mid- to late-
1980s, while the US rate exhibits rapid growth. Decreasing transaction costs may
help explain the similar growth in consumer bankruptcy in these two countries in
the 1990s. However, the data are consistent with an asymmetric change in the mid-
to late-1980s.
These phenomena point to a change in 1986. After 1986, insurance rates in
the US begin to decline, and the number of medically-related consumer bankruptcies
increased. As the insurance rate fell, the price of insurance increased. The following
sections explain these patterns with an adverse selection model of insurance and
default.
1.2 A Model of Insurance and Default
The economy described below has a unit measure of agents heterogeneous in their
risk. It is assumed that agents’ risk types are private information. This assumption
is drawn from the many legal mechanisms designed to ensure the privacy of health
information. For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) of 1996 mandated federal privacy protections for patients. Further, it is
assumed that signaling is not possible.
These assumptions lead to adverse selection in the medical insurance market.
The agents who choose medical insurance are those who are most likely to use it.
This is consistent with a wide array of medical insurance research. For example,
Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) finds that adverse selection led to the collapse of the
most generous medical insurance plan offered by Harvard University.
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1.2.1 The Agent’s Choice
Consider an agent that faces risk m˜xi. This risk is characterized by its PDF and
CDF, hi(mx),Hi(mx). Ex ante, before this risk is realized, the agent can purchase
insurance against this risk, ι = 1, at price $. After the risk is realized, ex post, the
agent without insurance can choose to default, d = 1, at price κ. All agents earn
income w and each makes the ex-ante insurance choice according to:
UI(w, m˜xi;$,κ, τ) = max
ι∈{0,1}
{
u(w −$ − τ), E
[
U˜D
]}
. (1.1)
Agents are taxed a lump sum amount τ ; the proceeds of this tax pay for the realized
risk that is defaulted on. This is the insurance choice framework of Pratt (1964),
with the additional opportunity to default on the realized risk ex post.
The utility of going uninsured is a random variable:
U˜D =
[
max
d
{u(w − m˜xi − τ), u(w − κ− τ)}
]
. (1.2)
If the realized mxi > κ, then the agent chooses to default. Otherwise, the agent
will pay for realized risk out of pocket.
An agent’s willingness to pay for medical insurance, pii, depends upon its risk,
m˜xi, the cost of default, κ, and the tax level τ : pi(m˜xi;κ, τ). If household i’s will-
ingness to pay for private medical insurance is greater than or equal to its price, i.e.,
pi(m˜xi;κ, τ) ≥ $, then the household will choose to buy insurance, ι(m˜xi;κ, τ) = 1.
1.2.2 The Markets for Insurance and Medical Care; the Govern-
ment
The insurance market is competitive, so that the price of insurance is equal to the
average realized risk of the insured. By the informational assumptions, there is only
one insurance type offered.
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Medical goods and services are provided by firms with linear technology that
converts consumption goods into medical goods. In order to ensure the existence
of medical firms, the government collects the lump-sum tax on households, and
redistributes this revenue to the hospitals in order to cover the lost revenue due to
defaults.
1.2.3 Equilibrium and Stability
Definition. An equilibrium is defined to be a price of insurance, $, tax level, τ ,
default decision rule d(mxi;κ, τ) and insurance decision rule ι(m˜xi;κ, τ) such that:
• ιi solves the household’s insurance choice, according to the discrete maximiza-
tion problem of (1.1);
• d(mxi;κ) solves the household’s default choice, according to the discrete de-
fault problem of (1.2);
• $ is equal to the average realized risk of the insured;
• and τ is set to expected amount of realized risk which is not paid for by agents
due to default.
Several reasonable assumptions specify the model to make it consistent with
empirical evidence and tractable:
• The unconditional distribution of realized medical uncertainty is Pareto of the
second kind (a.k.a. Lomax or Pearson Type IV).
• Individual i’s risk is characterized by the exponential distribution, with param-
eter λi. If the λi’s are distributed according to the gamma distribution, then
the unconditional distribution of realized risk will be Pareto. This identity is
derived in Harris (1968).
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• Preferences display constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).
Under these assumptions, an agent’s willingness to pay for medical insurance with
the availability of default is:
pi(λi;κ) =
1
r
log(Pr(mx≤κ) ∗ E(e−r∗m˜xi) + Pr(mxi < κ)e−rκ)
=
1
r
log
(
λi − re−(λi−r)κ
λi − r
)
Note that an agent’s willingness to pay does not depend upon the tax level. The
following results are important for the equilibrium results below. It is helpful to
note that agents with lower λs face higher risk: the mean of an exponential random
variable parameterized by λ is λ−1.
• limλi→0 pi(λi;κ) = κ, and limλi→0 pi(λi;κ) < 0;
• limλi→∞ pi(λi;κ) = 0, and limλi→∞ pi(λi;κ) = 0
• limλi→r pi(λi;κ) = 1r log(1+rκ), with 0 < pi(r;κ) < κ, and limλi→r pi(λi;κ) < 0
Theorem (Monotonicity of willingness to pay). For κ > 1
∂pi(λi;κ)
∂λ
< 0.
An informal sketch of intuition. The following inductive proof is structured as fol-
lows: first, establish that ∂pi(λi;κ)∂λ |λ=r < 0. Second, for any λ0 > r, ∂pi(λi;κ)∂λ |λ=λ0+ <
0
Since λi−re
−(λi−r)κ
λi−r > 1 the sign of
∂pi(λi;κ)
∂λ depends upon the sign of:
∂
∂λi
λi−re−(λi−r)κ
λi−r =
1 + rκe−(λi−r)κ − λi−re−(λi−r)κλi−r
λi − r
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The sign of equation 1.3 depends upon the two inequalities λ ≷ r, and f(λ) =
1 + rκe−(λi−r)κ ≷ λi−re−(λi−r)κλi−r = g(λ).
Using L’Hospital’s Rule, it can be shown that if κ > 1:
∂f(λ)
∂λ
|λ=r = −rκ2 > −rκ
2
2
=
∂g(λ)
∂λ
|λ=r.
For a small  > 0, f(r + ) < u(r + ), implying that u′(r + ) < 0. This
implies that for a small ε, f(r+ +ε) < u(r+ +ε), implying that u′(r+ +ε) < 0.
Mutatis mutandis, for a sequence of small negative numbers.
The monotonicity of pi(λ;κ), and the fact that limλ→0 pi(λ;κ) = κ implies
that even the agent facing the highest risk would rather purchase insurance rather
than default with perfect certainty.
This monotonicity allows us to draw the supply and demand curves as down-
ward sloping. Because of this, an equilibrium can be characterized by one marginal
agent, whose willingness to pay for insurance is equal to its price. For a marginal
agent, λm, the average expenditure of the insured is:
$(λm) =
∫ λm
0
t−1
tαe−t/β
βα+1Γ(λm/β, α+ 1)
dt
=
Γ(λm/β, α)
βΓ(λm/β, α+ 1)
, (1.3)
where Γ(x, α) is the incomplete gamma function. Three characteristics of the price
schedule of insurance, $(λm) will be important:
• limλm→∞$(λm) = 1αβ > 0,
• limλm→0$(λm) =∞, and
• d$(λi)dλi < 0.
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The probability of an uninsured agent of type λi choosing bankruptcy is
P (mx > κ|λi) = e−κλi . Then the mass of agents who go bankrupt are:∫ ∞
λm
e−κttα
e−t/β
βα+1Γ(α+ 1)
dt =
Γ(α+ 1)− Γ(λm(1/β + κ), α+ 1)
Γ(α+ 1)(1 + βκ)α+1
(1.4)
The average medical expenditure in the economy is
mx =
1
αβ
(1.5)
while the variance is given by:
Var(mx) =
α+ 1
α2β2(α− 1) . (1.6)
The proportion of agents with medical insurance is the CDF of the gamma distri-
bution evaluated at the marginal agent.
||Λ1|| = gammacdf(λm;α, β). (1.7)
Because of the downward-sloping supply curve, there may be multiple equi-
libria. In order to resolve this, I propose an equilibrium refinement.
Definition. An equilibrium characterized by its marginal agent, λm, is locally stable
if it can withstand a deviation from equilibrium behavior by an agent local to its
marginal agent.
Theorem. An equilibrium characterized by its marginal agent λm is locally stable
if for all local ε > 0
$(λm + ε) ≥ pi(λm + ε;κ)
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and
$(λm − ε) ≤ pi(λm − ε;κ)
The stability refinement is similar to the trembling-hand refinement of Selten
(1975), and the stability refinement of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). This refine-
ment is intuitive—the equilibria in this model are pooling equilibria. Because the
movements in insurance rates and prices are steady, it is unlikely that the equilibria
we observe is unstable. Further, stable equilibria produce better fits of the data, as
described below.
For reasonable parameter values, [α, β, r, κ], one of the three cases below
characterizes the existence of equilibria:
• no equilibrium exists;
• one instable equilibrium exists; or,
• two equilibria exist, one stable and the other not; the marginal agent of the
stable equilibrium faces a lesser risk than the marginal agent of the instable
equilibrium.
Figures 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 plot the price, $(λ), and willingness to pay, pi(λ;κ),
functions for three different parameterizations. There is an equilibrium where the
price of insurance equals its value to the marginal agent in Figures 1.6 and 1.7.
There is not an equilibrium in Figure 1.8.
The stability of the first two circumstances can be found in Figures 1.9 and
1.10. They demonstrate the previous intuition.
1.2.4 Is this a sensible specification of risk?
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 plot the empirical PDF and CDF of medical charges against
the fit of a Pareto distribution. One might naively treat medical charges the same
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way one would treat other stochastic variables: set up an ARMA process and use
the previous period’s medical charges as the state variable which determines the
risk faced by the agent in the next period. Since the medical expenditures are all
non-negative, it would seem natural to fit the ARMA process from the log of the
charge data. However, there are a large number of observations with no medical
charges. Since the natural log of zero is undefined, it makes little sense to fit the
expenditure data to a log-ARMA process.
Note that the empirical PDF is monotonically decreasing with a large tail.
This contradicts one implication of the log-ARMA fitting: in the cross-section log-
ARMA fits lead to lognormal cross-sections, whose PDFs are not monotonic.
1.2.5 Why CARA Preferences?
Figure 1.6(b) shows medical expenditures as a percentage of GDP leveling off in the
1990s. If preferences exhibited constant relative risk aversion, then the average risk
faced by households would not have changed. If the average risk does not change,
then the distribution of relative risk likely did not change either. In this case, the
degree of adverse selection in medical insurance would not have changed. This is
inconsistent with the decline in the insurance rate and the increased bankruptcy rate.
Figure 1.6(a) plots the medical expenditures per capita, as they increase across the
period. This would be consistent with the declining insurance rates and increasing
bankruptcy rates of this period.
Consider two agents facing the same absolute uncertainty. If preferences
exhibited constant relative risk aversion, the worker with the higher wage would
have a lesser willingness to pay for insurance than the low-wage worker. CRRA
preferences exhibit negative income elasticities. This runs contrary to the strong
positive association between higher wages and having medical insurance, as exhib-
ited in Table 1.1. A good deal of this positive association is due to the tax-exempt
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status of medical insurance. Higher-income workers face higher marginal tax rates.
This makes medical insurance relatively less expensive than wages. The positive
association between wages and insurance can only be partially explained by differ-
ing marginal tax rates using sensible price elasticities, such as those estimated in
Gruber and Poterba (1994a).
1.2.6 Why is the model static?
In this model, the cost of default is characterized by κ. In previous models of default,
the cost of default is derived from two sources: exclusion from the credit market
and some utility loss due to the “stigma” of default. The former cost is inherently
dynamic and demands a dynamic model.
However, the model here is static. This is because the timing of payments
to insurers, both in the model and in the real world, is also static. A previously
bankrupted household would not be kept from the insurance market because pay-
ment for insurance occurs before insurance pays for medical goods and services.
Likewise, there is no incentive for medical providers to deny their goods and ser-
vices so long as the individual pay for them.
This static model also overlooks the potential option value of medical in-
surance. If an uninsured employee develops a chronic condition, the insurer may
refuse to insure him or her. Starting in 2002, the Medical Expenditure Panel Sur-
vey (MEPS—described below), recorded the reason for a worker’s ineligibility for
medical insurance. Of over twenty-five thousand jobs recorded in the 2002 MEPS,
roughly ten percent of the respondents reported that they were ineligible to receive
medical insurance. Of these 2,500, only nine incidents of ineligibility were for med-
ical reasons. Over 1,700 respondents were not offered insurance because they did
not work enough hours.
The next chapter finds that a demand curve estimated from a one-period
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insurance choice model is consistent with previous estimates of the compensating
differential (i.e., price) for private medical insurance.
1.3 Estimation and Data
The model described above has four parameters to be estimated—α and β, which
characterize the distribution of risk in the economy, r, the degree of absolute risk
aversion, and κ, the cost of default. These four parameters are estimated using a
minimum-distance estimator on five moments from the model. These five moments
are:
• cost of insurance, Equation (1.3);
• bankruptcy rate, Equation (1.4);
• average medical charge, Equation (1.5);
• variance of the medical charges, Equation (1.6); and,
• proportion of agents with insurance, Equation, (1.7).
The minimum distance estimator takes the usual form:
φ∗ = [α∗, β∗, r∗, κ∗] = argmin(µd − µm(φ))W (µd − µm(φ))′, (1.8)
where µd is a vector of the moments from the data, µm(φ) is a vector of the moments
from the model evaluated at parameter values φ, and W is a weighting matrix. The
inverse of the variance-covariance of the moments is used as the weighting matrix.
Due to restrictions of the data below, the covariance of the price of insurance and
the other moments is assumed to be zero. This is consistent with the law of one
price in this model of insurance.
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The estimation program determines whether the candidate parameter vector
leads to zero, one or two candidate equilibria. If it is zero or one, the estimation
program has taken a “bad step.” If it is two, then the estimation procedure finds
the marginal agent for the stable equilibrium.
The moments are taken from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
of 1999. Medical expenditure data from 1987 is available in the National Medical
Expenditure Survey. However, there is no measure of medically-related bankruptcy
for this year. The year 1999 is chosen because this is the only year of the 1990s
where medical expenditure data and bankruptcy-survey data are available.
The MEPS provides nationally representative data on medical events such
as visits to the emergency room or outpatient procedures. The data provide expen-
diture information for each event, including the amount and source of expenditure
(e.g., private insurer, public insurer, or out-of-pocket (OOP)), and a breakdown of
expenditures according to the goods or services provided. Data was collected for a
nationally representative sample of households, and consists of the medical events
of each member of a household.
The sample is restricted to non-Veterans under 65 years old, to avoid Medi-
care and VA distortions. Since the availability of Medicaid is also distortional,
individuals in households rated as being below or very near the poverty line are also
excluded. The data also contain information on the insurance status of individuals,
which is used to find that approximately eighty percent of the individuals in the
sample had private health insurance in 1999.
There is a difference between how much is charged for a medical event, and
how much is eventually paid. These differ in part because of default. The charge
variables are commonly described as being the “sticker price” of the medical event—
in many instances, it is a starting point for negotiations rather than a final account
of liability. Since households would face a “sticker price” after the medical services
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are provided, charges are used for estimation purposes.4
The cost of medical insurance is also provided by the MEPS. Single coverage
of hospital and/or physician plan costs $2,324.76 on average.
The bankruptcy rate in the U.S. in 1999 was approximately 7.5 bankruptcies
per one-thousand citizens between the age 18 and 65. As mentioned above, Jacoby
et al. (2001) surveys bankrupt households and finds that about half of the bankrupt
households in their survey cite medical reasons as the primary cause of their financial
troubles. As a survey with limited response, the estimates of Jacoby et al. (2001)
potentially suffer from response bias. For example, if wealthier bankrupt households
were more likely to respond, then the causes of bankruptcy would be skewed towards
those causes predominantly experienced by the wealthy. Unfortunately, the MEPS
does not have any variables concerning the bankruptcy status of households. How-
ever, the MEPS reports both the expenditures and charges of each medical event,
such as a visit to the doctor or emergency room.
Since the data do not report who was charged, default on the part of the
individual must be inferred. EMTALA covers visits to emergency rooms and subse-
quent inpatient stays, so an EMTALA-related default must be associated with such
an event. In order to count as a medical event where the household likely defaulted
on the medical charges, a medical event must satisfy the following criteria:
• the ER visitor is uninsured; and
• the difference between expenditures and charges is at least $5000.
The MEPS asks medical service providers why charges differ from expenditures.
Unfortunately, these answers are not provided in publicly available data.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 present estimated parameters and data and model mo-
ments, respectively. The model fits the moments well. The overidentification statis-
4While insurers routinely pay less than amount charged, uninsured households are in a much
weaker negotiating position.
17
tic, which is distributed χ2(1) is less than four. The standard errors presented
are calculated via bootstrapping, which is feasible because the estimation method
is fast. Fewer than two percent of the one thousand bootstrap subsamples lacked
observations with default .
Searching for stable equilibria also found the equilibrium that best fit the
data moments. This procedure was set to solve for instable equilibria, and the fit
was bad (i.e., large overidentification statistics). While this is not a result of the
model, it is consistent with the intuitive appeal of the stability refinement.
1.3.1 Policy Experiments
An obvious question arises: what if we repealed EMTALA? Or, at the very least,
made it costlier for the uninsured to default on medical bills? The qualitative
answer is clear: the new stable equilibrium will have more agents choosing insur-
ance, decreasing the cost of insurance and lowering the rate of medically-related
bankruptcy.5
One way to make it costlier to default on medical debt would be to treat it
differently in bankruptcy proceedings. The first policy experiment limits the ability
of households to default on medical debt: make households liable for $1400 worth
of medical goods and services above and beyond standard bankruptcy costs.6 The
price of insurance is relatively inelastic, as it falls by just over $100. However, the
insurance rate increases by over six percent, and the default rate falls by two orders
of magnitude. The second column of Table 1.4 reports the changes in the insurance
rate, default rate and the price of insurance under this policy change.
Estimating the effects of fully repealing EMTALA is more complicated. Even
if EMTALA were repealed, hospitals would still likely provide some free care for the
5The answers are opposite for an instable equilibrium. This runs contrary to the US experience
after EMTALA. This, along with the fact that stable equilibria fit the data better, reinforce this
choice of refinement.
6This corresponds to a twenty-five percent increase in the cost of default,κ.
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uninsured facing large medical bills, as part of their not-for-profit mission. Because
of this, the effects of repealing EMTALA as measured here are likely to be overes-
timates. The changes measured in this second experiment correspond to the repeal
of EMTALA and the end of free care, both of which distort the demand for medical
insurance. This counterfactual is calculated by setting κ to an arbitrarily large num-
ber. The third column of Table 1.4 presents the results of this policy experiment.
The insurance rate increases to over 90%, while the cost of insurance falls to just
over $2,000. The default rate is approximately zero.
It may be unlikely that the not-for-profit mission of hospitals could be over-
turned at the same time EMTALA is repealed. Because of this, I run a third
experiment: set κ to $20,000. This limits an uninsured agent’s liability in the event
of onerous medical expense, while mitigating the potential effects of on insurance
demand. Setting κ =$20,000 is a first-best guess at which point hospitals would
provide charity care. The effects of this policy experiment are reported in the final
column of Table 1.4. The effects are similar to those of the previous experiment.
If the cost of default decreases too much, then there may not be an equi-
librium with insurance. The demand curve lies entirely below the supply curve if
the cost of default falls much below $5000. This is a strong result, though its intu-
ition is sound. Medical insurance is expensive. As it becomes easier to opt out of
medical bills, an agent’s willingness to pay for insurance decreases. If the provision
of reduced-billing medical care becomes too widespread, then no one will pay for
medical insurance.
1.3.2 What if EMTALA never happened?
This paper was originally motivated by the precipitous decline of medical insurance
rates in the mid- to late-1980s. This section asks: What would have happened after
1986 had EMTALA not been passed?
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As Cutler (2004) finds, medical technology has made great advancements
in the past fifty years. For example, patients with heart attacks now receive more
effective and expensive care than their counterparts in the 1950s. Because of this,
it is unlikely that the distribution of medical risk, as characterized by α and β,
remained constant through the 1980s and 1990s. In order to isolate the effects of
EMTALA, these parameters must be estimated for the mid-1980s.
There is only one publicly-available data set that provides the cross-sectional
distribution of medical charges for the mid-1980s. The National Medical Expendi-
ture Survey collected such data for 1987. These data are used to find α1987 and
β1987, using the method of moments estimation described in Harris (1968). The
cost of default for 1987, κ1987, is set to match the insurance rate among the same
population as above, and likely reflects the availability of free care for very rare and
very expensive medical events.7 Although 1987 is after the passage of EMTALA, it
is unlikely the full effects of EMTALA were incurred until later. The estimate of
κ1987 of over $34,000 reflects this.
As mentioned before, there is reason to believe there were changes to the
credit market beyond the scope of this model in the mid- to late-1990s. In order to
isolate these changes from the effects of EMTALA, the final year of the experiment
is 1996. The first wave of the MEPS was collected in 1996, and provides the infor-
mation required to estimate the distribution of medical risk in 1996, i.e., α1996 and
β1996. The cost of default in 1996, κ1996, is set to match the insurance rate among
non-Veterans under the age of 65 whose household was above the poverty line. These
parameters and moments can be found in Table 1.5. A linear trend provides the
parameters of the risk distribution for the years between 1987 and 1996. Finally, the
parameter of absolute risk aversion, r, is taken from the previous estimation from
7Because the NMES does not provide a variable stating whether a household is above or below
the poverty line, all individuals whose households had wage earnings of less than $8,000 were
excluded. $8,000 was chosen as it sits between the poverty lines for a families of two and three
members.
20
the 1999 data.
Two trends of insurance rates are provided in Figure 1.12. The first, without
EMTALA, finds the equilibrium insurance rate if the cost of defaulting on medical
goods and services were held constant throughout the period. The second trend
keeps κ1987 for 1987, and sets the cost of default to κ1996 for each subsequent year.
Had EMTALA not passed into law, the insurance rate would have increased
from 1987 to 1996. The distribution of medical risk shifted in a way that would have
led to less adverse selection and more risk sharing. These changes mask EMTALA’s
consequences as read from a simple plot of insurance rates over time, as in Figure
1.1.
1.4 Conclusion and Extensions
The number of consumer bankruptcies has grown dramatically since the mid-1980s.
At the same time, the proportion of workers with medical insurance has fallen, while
its price has grown. This paper ties both of these empirical phenomena to the 1986
passage of EMTALA. Had EMTALA not passed, the US insurance rate would have
increased significantly after 1986, instead of the decrease that has been observed.
Among other parameters, this paper estimates the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion. The estimation strategy depends upon the monotonicity of the insurance
price schedule, $(·), as it restricts the number and type of equilibria. Different
preferences or distortional public insurance could lead to a non-monotonic price
schedule.
Consider an economy where the agents have CRRA preferences. Agents
are heterogenous in their risk like before. Most agents have wealth w1, while a
smaller number have w2 > w1. Figure 1.11 sketches out the price schedule in
this environment. The non-monotonicity is caused by the wealthier agents whose
willingness to pay for insurance is less than their counterpart with the same absolute
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risk but less wealth.
Before, stability was invoked to choose among equilibria, and it worked well
because stable equilibria were unique. Figure 1.11 indicates two stable equilibria
exist. Adding more features to the model, such as the availability of public insurance,
might also add more stable equilibria.
Estimation programs need to know which of the candidate stable equilibria
to choose. The equilibria are Pareto ordered, with more insurance Pareto preferred
to less. This is consistent with the literature of macroeconomic complementarities,
as discussed in Cooper (1999). It provides a first-principles rationale for choosing
among equilibria.
That said, it is not clear that the medical insurance market is Pareto optimal.
Recent legislative action has attempted to shift away from the current equilibrium.
The most well known of these initiatives was passed in Massachusetts, where taxing
un-insurance was designed to increase the number of citizens with insurance and
decrease its cost. Was this an attempt to make a Pareto-improving shift, or was it
just the insured median voter attempting to decrease the cost of his or her insurance?
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Figure 1.1: Consumer Bankruptcy and Insurance
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Figure 1.2: Bankruptcy in the US
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Figure 1.3: Empirical PDF of Charges and a Gamma-mix Pareto fit
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x 104
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Data
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
Empirical CDF
Gamma−mix Pareto fit
Figure 1.4: Empirical CDF of charges and a Gamma-mix Pareto fit
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Figure 1.5: Medical Expenditures in the U.S.
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Figure 1.6: Two equilibria.
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Figure 1.7: One equilibrium.
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Figure 1.8: No equilibria.
28
← More Risk       λ       Less Risk →
W
illi
ng
ne
ss
 to
 p
ay
 fo
r, 
Pr
ice
 o
f I
ns
ur
an
ce
Stability of two equilibria:  α=1.05 β=.003 r=0.01 κ=50,000
pi(λ;κ)
ϖ(λ)
Figure 1.9: The equilibrium with a lower insurance rate is not stable, while the
equilibrium with the higher insurance rate is stable.
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Figure 1.10: The single equilibrium for these parameter values is not stable—it will
not withstand the marginal agent deviating from equilibrium behavior.
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Figure 1.11: A non-monotonic price schedule can lead to multiple stable equilibria,
which complicates estimation.
31
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
Year
In
su
ra
nc
e 
ra
te
How many people would have had medical insurance without EMTALA?
With EMTALA
Without EMTALA
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and without EMTALA. The estimation procedure for this graph is described in the
text.
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Table 1.1: Insurance Rates Among the Employed Before and After EMTALA, by
Income
Income 1985-6 1988-9 ∆
0-5K 36.0 30.9 -5.1
5-10K 51.7 45.5 -6.2
10-20K 80.0 74.3 -6.7
20-30K 92.4 88.9 -3.5
30-50K 96.5 95.2 -1.3
50K+ 97.9 97.4 -0.5
All 87.9 84.9 -3.0
As reported in Gruber and Poterba (1994a).
Table 1.2: Estimated Parameters (SEs) Using Percent Deviation from Moments
α β r κ
1.1263 4.5809× 10−4 0.002 5,668.8
(0.0156) ( 6.91× 10−6) (3.16× 10−5) (150.85)
Table 1.3: Model Moments from Estimated Parameters in Table 1.2
Moment Data Fit
ι 0.784 0.7839
$ 2,324.76 2,324
d 1.803× 10−4 1.72× 10−5
mx 1984.93 1,938
σmx 8392.79 7957.39
χ2 = 3.8745
Table 1.4: Model Moments of Experiments %
Moment Fit Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
ι 0.7839 0.8481 0.9178 0.9178
$ 2,324.8 2,199.5 2.0751 2,075.1
d 1.72× 10−5 1.1085× 10−7 0 0
mx 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938
σmx 7957.39 7957.39 7957.39 7957.39
Experiment 1 gives preferential treatment to medical debtors. It corresponds to setting κ = 7085.
Experiment 2 repeals EMTALA and ignores the availability of free care for the uninsured with
large medical bills. The corresponds to κ equal to the largest real number Matlab can manage:
1.7977× 10308. The third and final experiment repeals EMTALA, but allows for some free care
for the uninsured when the medical bill is greater than $20,000.
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Table 1.5: The estimated parameters and moments for the years of interest of the
final policy experiment.
1987 1996
αyear 1.10988 1.0797
βyear 6.7×10−4 5.633×10−4
ιyear .7949 .786
κyear 34,843 7,085.8
κyear was set to match the insurance rate of that year, ιyear. The NMES (1987) and MEPS
(1996) were used to find αyear and βyear.
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Chapter 2
How Much for Your Medical
Insurance? Using the Theory of
Equalizing Differences:
In the United States private medical insurance is an amenity that many jobs of-
fer. Since private medical insurance is a costly and desirable amenity, a worker
should receive higher wages if private medical insurance is not part of a job’s benefit
package. This difference in wages is the compensating differential—how much more
money in wages does the worker receive if the firm does not provide private medical
insurance.
Marginal income taxes distort the choice between benefits and wages. Firms’
contributions for private medical insurance are tax-exempt. If a worker went with-
out these benefits, then the compensating differential would be subject to income
taxes. This drives a tax wedge between wage income and insurance, leading to
“overinsurance.”
Increasing marginal tax rates increases the size of this tax wedge, increasing
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the number of workers with insurance. The relationship between marginal tax rates
and the number of jobs without private medical insurance can be expressed as an
elasticity. If this “market elasticity” is large, then a small change in the tax code
would have a large effect on the number of Americans privately insured through
their jobs.
This market elasticity should be contrasted with what has typically been
estimated in the previous literature. Studies such as Gruber and Poterba (1994b)
have focused on the price elasticity of individuals—i.e., how does the probability of
having medical insurance adjust as the marginal tax rate changes. These studies use
discrete choice models with latent equations determining the probability of having
insurance. However, the price elasticity of individuals is not sufficient to calculate
the market elasticity. Were these papers to attempt to convert the price elasticity
(“how do probabilities change”) into a market elasticity (“how many people actually
switch”), the methods would likely depend upon the fitted values of the latent
equation.
Doing this has two main flaws. The fitted values of the latent equation have
no economic meaning; they are just econometric conveniences. Moreover, these fit-
ted values are consistent only if all the estimates of the latent equation are themselves
consistent. Typical explanatory variables in the latent equation are age, gender and
family size. Medical information is usually omitted from the latent equation. It is
unlikely that these fitted values are actually consistent.
I avoid these pitfalls by estimating the demand curve for private medical
insurance, and use that to estimate the market elasticity, and the potential effects of
large tax changes. Private medical insurance covers the uncertain nature of medical
expenditures. Following Pratt (1964), a household’s willingness to pay for insurance
is a combination of the amount it expects to spend for medical goods and services,
and the variance of the medical expenditure risk. The distribution of willingness to
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pay constitutes the demand curve for private medical insurance.
It is also worthwhile to contrast this approach with Olson (2002). Like many
previous studies of compensating differentials, Olson (2002) attempts to measure the
compensating differential for private medical insurance. Olson’s (2002) estimated
compensating differentials are consistent with those found in this study. However,
Olson (2002) estimates are not sufficient to find the market elasticity, much as
determining the price of an apple does not tell us how many apples would be bought
and eaten if the price of apples doubled.
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) is used to estimate the de-
mand curve for private medical insurance. The MEPS provides a rich collection of
information on an entire household’s medical expenditures and their source, such as
private medical insurance. Variety in medical expenditure risk faced by households
leads to variety in willingness to pay for private medical insurance.
In the main sample from 2002, approximately one-quarter of the jobs do
not include private medical insurance as part of the compensation package. The
market elasticity is found to be between one and two—that is, if firms are taxed one
cent for every dollar spent on private medical insurance for its employees, then the
proportion of jobs without private medical insurance will increase between one and
two percent. If firms are taxed at the worker’s marginal tax rate (Federal income
tax plus FICA), then approximately 35 percent of the jobs would be without private
medical insurance.
The balance of the chapter is as follows: first, a theoretical model is posited,
to explain the relationship between a household’s insurance choice, tax policy and
the compensating differential; an estimation strategy for the demand curve for pri-
vate medical insurance; measurements of the market elasticity and the effects of a
changes of tax policy; and a conclusion.
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2.1 Theoretical Model
This section constructs a theoretical model designed to be consistent with many of
the real-world features of a household’s private medical insurance choice:
• households value private medical insurance according to their medical expen-
diture risk;
• the cost of private medical insurance is not taxed, while wage income is, per
the US tax code;
• and workers are paid less for jobs with private medical insurance, ceteris
paribus.
Consider a one period model, with workers, firms, and insurers. There are
two markets: the market for labor and the market for insurance. Both markets are
efficient, so a worker’s total compensation equals his or her marginal product; and
the cost of insurance is equal to its cost of production.
2.1.1 The Workers’ Problem
Workers are risk averse and face risk in medical expenditures. They are heterogenous
in this risk: worker i faces risk m˜xi. Workers are also heterogenous in productiv-
ity, with worker i’s productivity given by wi. Medical expenditures are consumed
inelastically, so are treated as a loss in income.
Workers face a wage tax. The tax schedule may have kinks, so the average
rate φai , and the marginal rate φ
m
i may differ for an individual, and vary across
individuals. It is important to note that this tax is on wages only. This tax pays
for a public good, G, which all workers enjoy.
Workers can purchase private medical insurance directly from an insurer, or
obtain it as part of their compensation package from a firm. If the worker purchases
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private medical insurance from the insurer, the price is psins. If the worker does not
want insurance as part of the compensation package, then the after-tax wage without
medical insurance is (1−φai )ωins=0i ; if insurance is included, then the after-tax wage
is (1 − φmi )ωins=1i . The before-tax difference, ωins=0i − ωins=1i , is the compensating
differential of private medical insurance. If the worker chooses insurance, the worker
acquires it from the low-price provider: either through the firm, or directly from the
insurer.
Workers face the maximization problem:
max{ E[U((1− φai )ωins=0i − m˜xi, G)],
U((1− φai )ωins=1i , G), (2.1)
U((1− φai )ωins=0i − pinsi , G)}.
with U(c,G) = u(c) + v(G), with consumption c and level of public good supplied
by the taxation of wages, G. The first term is the expected utility if the worker does
not have private medical insurance. The second term is the expected utility if the
worker has insurance through the employer, while the third term is the utility if the
worker buys insurance directly from the insurer.
If preferences display constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) in consumption,
a worker’s willingness to pay for private medical insurance is a fraction pi(z˜i) of his
or her wage such that:
E[U((1− φai )ωins=0i − m˜xi, G)] = U((1− φai )ωins=0i − pi(z˜i)ωins=0i , G)
As Pratt (1964) shows, this proportion is a function of the expectation and variance
of worker’s risk:
pi(z˜i) =
1
2
rσ2zi + E(z˜i),
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where r is the worker’s coefficient of relative risk aversion; E(z˜i) = E( m˜xi(1−φai )ωins=0i
)
is the expected value of the risk, proportional to the worker’s income; and σ2zi =
σ2mxi
((1−φai )ωins=0i )2
is the variance of the risk, made proportional to the worker’s income.
Previously in the literature, pi(z˜i) has been referred to as the marginal will-
ingness to pay for medical insurance. Since this willingness to pay is a function
of risk aversion, I will refer to it as the insurance premium. This should not be
confused with the use of “premium” as seen as deductions on paychecks. This ter-
minology unfortunately conflates the value of insurance (the usage of economists),
and its price (what human resources departments list).
Workers choose whether to include insurance as part of a job’s compensation
package according to the inequality of Equation (2.2). The worker’s problem can
now be reduced to:
pi(z˜i)ωins=0i ≷ min{(1− φmi )(ωins=0i − ωins=1i ), pinsi } (2.2)
Note that the price of insurance from the firm is the after-tax compensating
differential. If pi(z˜i)ωins=0i ≥ (1 − φmi )(ωins=0i − ωins=1i ) > pinsi , then the worker
buys private medical insurance directly from the insurer. If pi(z˜i)ωins=0i ≥ pinsi >
(1− φmi )(ωins=0i − ωins=1i ), then the worker gets private medical insurance from his
or her employer. If pi(z˜i)ωi < min{(1−φmi )(ωins=0i −ωins=1i ), pinsi }, then the worker
forgoes medical insurance altogether.
2.1.2 The Production of Insurance and Equilibrium Behavior
The production of private insurance costs insurers a constant proportion $ of the
productivity of the worker. The private medical insurance market is competitive,
so the market price of private medical insurance is equal to its cost of production,
psins = $wi. The insurers can sell insurance to either workers or firms.
The firm’s production technology has only one input, labor, and its output is
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the sum of the marginal productivity of its workers. Since the labor market is com-
petitive, the total compensation of a worker is equal to that worker’s productivity,
wi. If the worker does not want private medical insurance to be included as part of
the compensation package, then the worker is paid ωins=0i = wi. If the worker does
want private medical insurance to be provided by the firm, then the wage reflects
the cost of insurance to the firm: ωins=1i = (1 − $)wi. Thus, the compensating
differential is a proportion $ of a worker’s productivity.
The tax schedule is taken as exogenous. Tax revenue is used to purchase
public good G. While the use of tax revenue has important welfare implications,
such welfare questions are beyond the scope of this chapter.
The taxation of wage income leads to an important aspect of this model. If
φmi > 0, workers prefer to include private medical insurance as part of their job’s
benefit package, rather than buy it from the insurer directly. If the worker were
to buy insurance directly from the insurer, then wage taxes would be due on the
income used to pay for the insurance. If insurance is provided by the employer, this
extra wage tax is circumvented.
Because of the potential heterogeneity in marginal tax rates, it is convenient
to adjust the insurance premia for marginal tax rates: pi(z˜i) =
pi(z˜i)
(1−φmi ) . The inequal-
ity which governs the choice of private medical insurance, Equation (2.2), can now
be re-written:
pi(z˜i) ≷ $.
2.1.3 Finding the Market Elasticity
Suppose that the heterogeneity in pi(z˜i) is described by the PDF in Figure 2.1. The
vertical line marks where pi(z˜i) = $—i.e., where the worker’s insurance premium
pi(z˜i) is equal to its price $. The mass of workers to the right of this line will choose
private medical insurance, while those workers to the left will forgo it.
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Figure 2.1: A Hypothetical Distribution of Insurance Premia
Suppose the cost of producing private medical insurance increases: $ in-
creases. The vertical line in Figure 2.1 shifts to the right, without affecting the
distribution of pi(z˜i). More employees would decline private medical insurance.
The number of workers without private medical insurance changes with the
compensating differential according to ∂D($)∂$ = d($). Converting this into an elas-
ticity yields the market elasticity:
 = $(
d($)
D($)
), (2.3)
where d is the PDF of pi(z˜i)’s, and D is the CDF pi(z˜i)’s.
The compensating differential is the firms’ marginal cost of providing private
medical insurance; so taxing firms’ private medical insurance cost increases the
compensating differential. Taxing firms τ times the cost of providing private medical
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insurance increases the compensating differential to (1+τ)$. The worker receives an
(1−φmi )(1+ τ)$ increase in after-tax wages if private medical insurance is forgone.
Taxing the households does not change firms’ marginal cost of private med-
ical insurance production. However, it does change the value of private medical
insurance to workers. If the household is taxed τ times the cost of the private med-
ical insurance it receives, then the value of private medical insurance to worker i
is pi(z˜i) − τ$. Worker i’s after-tax proportional insurance premium is pi(z˜i) − τ$,
and the distribution of values is shifted to the left. If the worker forgoes medical
insurance, then he or she receives the compensating differential less the marginal
wage tax, (1− φmi )$.
This leads to an important result: fewer workers will have medical insurance
if the worker is taxed for having medical insurance than if firms’ expenditure on
medical insurance is taxed. In this theoretical model, private medical insurance is
subsidized through the compensating differential at rate φmi $. This subsidy comes
from the non-taxation of private medical insurance. Taxing firms’ expenditures on
medical insurance increases this subsidy by φmi τ$. If the worker is taxed for having
private medical insurance, then the compensating differential is not changed; thus,
the subsidy does not change. In both cases, though, the tax increases the cost of
having private medical insurance at the same rate, τ$. However, taxing the firm
increases the subsidy to private medical insurance via the compensating differential.
The focus of this chapter is: how many more jobs would be without medical
insurance if the cost of medical insurance were taxed as income. The balance of this
chapter is focused on estimating distribution of pi(z˜i). From this, the sensitivity of
the number of jobs without medical insurance to a shift in taxes can be found. Since
the number of jobs in the sample with medical insurance is known, the distribution
will imply a compensating differential. If the static model and degree of risk aversion
are correct, then the implied compensating differential should be similar to previous
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estimates.
2.2 The Data and Econometric Models
The data are from Panels Six and Seven of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS), with information from 2002. The MEPS provides a rich set of data on
medical insurance, medical expenditures, and their sources, for individuals. Entire
households are interviewed, so the intra-household aspects of medical insurance de-
cisions can be observed. When a member of the household is employed, information
on that job, such as occupation, wage, benefits, hours, and firm size and industry,
is collected. The medical expenditures are broken down into sources, such as pri-
vate medical insurance, public medical insurance (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid), and
out-of-pocket.
For the purpose of this research, and for comparability to previous work, the
insurance variable of interest is whether or not private medical insurance is part
of the current job’s benefit package. Data on medical insurance acquired through
COBRA (for individuals who lose or leave their jobs), or supplemental Medicare
insurance, are beyond the focus here.
The household’s average and marginal federal income tax rate and marginal
FICA rate are computed using NBER’s TAXSIM. The MEPS provides several vari-
ables, such as dependent identifiers, tax filing information, and non-wage property
income, that allow for a detailed calculation of worker’s federal tax profile (i.e., φai
and φmi ).
The estimation of medical expenditure risk is based on medical condition
information. This information is also provided by the MEPS. Conditions are coded
according to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) system. This coding
system is particularly useful to economists, as it classifies conditions according to
the medical specialty that provides treatment, which in large part determines the
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cost of treatment.
This information was used to construct condition dummy variables for indi-
viduals with the following conditions: essential hypertension, lipid disorders (high
cholesterol), pregnancy, diabetes, cancer (excluding skin), psychological disorders
(depression and anxiety), allergies, sinusitis and other. These conditions were either
identified by the ICD-9 code, or an aggregation of ICD-9 codes provided by the
MEPS. The vector of condition dummy variables will be referred to as the individ-
ual’s condition profile.
Since the condition profile is the primary determinant of medical expendi-
ture, an individual’s knowledge of his or her condition profile is key to estimating
the expectation and variance of medical expenditure risk. Two extreme cases are
considered: in the first, the condition profile is known to the individual. In the
second case, the probability of having a condition is forecast from a set of medically
relevant demographic variables.
The first case is provided as lower bound for the insurance premia values,
since no one knows with perfect certainty what conditions will be realized. The
second case is an upper bound; much of the relevant information determining the
true probability, such as family history, is known to the individual but not the
econometrician. The estimated variance of the forecast will be larger than the
true variance of the forecast. Since many of the conditions under consideration are
either chronic (e.g., hypertension, diabetes, high cholesterol), or otherwise frequently
known to the individual (pregnancy), the first case should be a more reasonable
approximation of true insurance premia.
The strong relationship between medical conditions and medical expendi-
tures also undermines any attempt to estimate the risk z˜i without medical condition
information. If the estimation of risk z˜i were undertaken with demographic informa-
tion only, and the condition profile omitted, the strong correlation between many of
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these conditions and the demographic variables such as age and gender would lead
to biased estimates.
The medical expenditures reported in the data are annual. In order to focus
on the dollar value of medical goods and services private medical insurance would be
expected to provide, expenditures paid for an insured individual by private medical
insurance are used. These annual variables are divided by the number of months
the individual is insured, to make them comparable to the monthly wage data.
Since going to the doctor is less expensive for the insured, it may be the case
that the insured are diagnosed more often, ceteris paribus. To correct for this, Heckit
estimation is used to find the expectation and variance of an individual’s medical
expenditures paid for by private medical insurance. The two estimated equations
are:
mxi = Ciβ + u1
Ii = 1(Ciγ1 + Fiγ2 + u2 > 0),
where mxi is observed if Ii == 1 (insurance is observed), and Fi is information
that affects the likelihood of being insured, but not the medical expenditure of the
individual. Information on the condition profiles of the other household members
is used to identify the second equation. By assumption, u1 is uncorrelated within
a household, and the insurance decision is made on the household level. The larger
the expected expenditures within the household beyond the individual in question,
ceteris paribus, the more likely the worker will include health insurance as part of
the benefit package.
The selection equation should not be confused with the inequality in Equa-
tion (2.2), which determines the medical insurance choice. The regression equation
describes the level of medical expenditure, not its proportion of wages. Further,
insurance decisions are made at the household level, and such information is not
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included except as instruments.
Since u1 is uncorrelated within a household by assumption, the total expected
value and variance for a household is the sum of the household members’ expected
values and variances. The sum of the fitted values is divided by the after-tax monthly
wage, and sum of the variances of the fitted values is divided by the square of the
after-tax monthly wage, to convert them into the expectation and variance of a
proportional risk.
In the first case, the condition profiles are used as explanatory variables
in the expenditure equation. Due to the limitations of the data, these indicate
whether the medical condition occurred at some point during the year, but not
for how many weeks that treatment was received. Some of these conditions have
a variety of medical services that could be used for treatment. For example, one
person’s diabetes may be more severe than another’s, requiring more costly services.
The variance of the regression equation comes from two sources: uncertainty in the
severity and duration of the condition.
In the second case, the explanatory variables are the condition profile fore-
cast. The variables are split into three groups: Demographic information X, which
is a collection of known things, such as age, gender, body-mass index (BMI), whether
the individual smokes, race, and Hispanic ethnicity; the condition profile, C, is not
known to the individual, but the individual can use the known demographics to
inform a consistent estimate of Ĉ; and mxi, which is the expenditure by private
medical insurance in treating the realized conditions. The estimation procedure has
the following order:
Xi → Ĉi → m̂xi.
This is not unlike Woodridge’s (2002) Procedure 17.2, which is a Heckit
estimation with endogenous regressors. Procedure 17.2 can be translated into the
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three equations:
Ci = Xiγ + u3 (2.4)
mxi = Ciβ + u4 (2.5)
HIi = 1(Ciδ + u5 > 0) (2.6)
where mxi is observed if HIi == 1.
Equation (2.4) estimates the probability an individual will have some vector
of conditions. Someone who is more likely to have hypertension than the demo-
graphics would otherwise suggest should also be otherwise more likely to suffer from
a lipid disorder. That is, errors are likely to be correlated across equations. To
account for this, the sub-equations of Equation (2.4) are estimated using a standard
seemingly-unrelated regression techniques in a linear probability model.
The Heckit estimation uses the fitted probabilities to estimate the medical
expenditures equation. The variance-covariance matrix of Equation (2.5) is Ω. Per
Feldstein (1971), the variance of the forecast is:
σ2mxi = Ĉ
′ΩĈ + β′Φβ + trace(ΦΩ) + σ2u2 . (2.7)
The first and last term are what is traditionally known as the variance of the fitted
value, while the middle two terms arise from the estimation variance of Ĉ. It should
be noted that Feldstein’s (1971) calculation requires that u3 is uncorrelated with
(u4, u5). If this does not hold, then the two-step estimation is not efficient. This
would lead to overestimation of σ2mxi , and reinforce the overestimation of pi(m˜xi). It
also omits added variance from interacting the forecast and the selection equation.
However, since the estimated selection effects are weak, this omission is unlikely to
be large.
The demographic variables are excluded from the expenditure equation. This
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approach makes a strong, though sensible, identification assumption. Expenditures
are influenced by demographic information only insofar as they make an individual
more likely to suffer from a condition. Older individuals, for example, have more
expenditures not by the very fact that they are old. Rather, aging is positively
associated with any number of costly conditions.
The estimates of Equation (2.4), using a seemingly-unrelated linear proba-
bilities model, are presented in Table 2.2. Most conditions are positively associated
with age and BMI. Second-order terms and interactions with gender are provided,
since, for example, pre-menopausal women infrequently suffer from lipid disorders.
The estimated variance-covariance matrix of the SUR is provided in Table 2.3. The
off-diagonal elements (cross-equation variance) are as high as one-third of the respec-
tive on-diagonal elements (within-equation variance). The signs of the off-diagonal
variances are intuitive, with a positive covariance for the errors in the hypertension,
lipid disorder, and diabetes equations.
In both cases, the estimation used a sample of individuals over the age of
sixteen. For children sixteen and younger, the average and variance of expenditures
were used for the expectation and variance of expenditures, respectively. It is un-
usual to observe many of these conditions in persons under the age of seventeen. In
the second case, the demographics used for adults, such as BMI and smoking, are
not comparable for youths. Also, veterans are removed because their expenditures
on medical goods and services paid for by private insurance will be skewed by the
availability of VA benefits.
These procedures will produce distributions of pi(z˜i), which imply the com-
pensating differential $. However, before the distribution is computed, the wages
for jobs with medical insurance must be increased by (1−φmi )$, the after-tax com-
pensating differential. This is resolved by starting with an educated initial guess,
$0, and updating that guess with the implied compensating differential, $1. This
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process is iterated until $n ≈ $n+1.
2.2.1 Estimation Results
When the condition profile is known to the individual, the expenditure equation
estimates are sensible. These estimates are provided in Table 2.1. The units of the
estimates are weekly expenditures. Cancer ($60 per week) is more expensive than
sinusitis and allergies, for example. The demographic variables, age, gender and
their interactions are not statistically significant. This should come as no surprise,
since medical expenditures are primarily a result of medical conditions. While we
may intuit older individuals consuming more medical goods and services such as
office visits, this effect pales in comparison to the increase in expenditures when a
person of any age becomes diabetic, or suffers from depression or anxiety.
The estimate of λ, which measures the degree to which selection impacts
the medical expenditure equation, is not statistically significant from zero. That
is, individuals with private medical insurance do not spend more for medical ser-
vices than those without, ceteris paribus. For example, when the marginal effects
are estimated, the expenditure equation’s effects dominate. This suggests that the
diagnosis of conditions is independent of having private medical insurance. The
estimation of Equation (2.4) is provided in Table 2.2.
Since family history of these conditions is an omitted variable in this esti-
mation, omitted variable bias is a concern for the BMI estimates. For example, an
individual might attempt to lose weight when his or her father contracts hyperten-
sion. However, many of these conditions are late onset, so a family history for a
condition may not become established until the parents are in their 50s or 60s. This
means that the persons themselves will not learn of their own family history until
their 30s or 40s. At these ages, weight-loss is complicated by lower metabolism and
the difficulty of changing lifestyle habits, such as diet and (lack of) exercise.
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The estimated variance-covariance matrix of the SUR is provided in Table
2.3. Its off-diagonal elements suggest that, for example, someone who has hyper-
tension in spite of a low predicted probability of having hypertension is also likely
to have diabetes in spite of a low predicted probability of having diabetes. Many of
these cross-equation variances are more than a tenth of the own-equation variances,
some as high as a third. This suggests that the condition probability equations
should not be estimated independently.
The estimates of Equations (2.5) and (2.6) can be found in Table 2.4. The
standard errors of the estimation are large, and this is by design. Large standard
errors lead to a large amount of uncertainty if the individual goes uninsured. The
estimates themselves are less satisfactory, with increased probability of some condi-
tions associated with decreased expected expenditure. However, this does not lead
to negative forecasted values of medical expenditure. For cancer and diabetes, the
estimates are positive.
The second and third terms of Equation (2.7) are the added variances due
to the uncertainty of forecasting the condition profile. This additional variance is,
on average, one and a half times the variance of the first and fourth terms. That
is, the variance due to the uncertainty in forecasting (the terms with Φ) is a large
component of the overall variance.
2.3 The Distribution of Insurance Premia
With these measures of a household’s medical expenditure risk, we have an estimated
demand curve for private medical insurance. We can now use this distribution to
estimate the market elasticity of marginal tax rates and the effects of large tax
changes.
As mentioned above, TAXSIM provided the average and marginal Federal
income and FICA tax rates. They were calculated using a projected annual wage
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income (weekly earnings times fifty-two); variables on filing status and old and
young dependents were used in the calculation. Other non-wage property income
is available in the data, but were not used in the TAXSIM calculations. They were
not used, in part, because the MEPS documentation warns that such variables are
not edited for consistency. Due to privacy restrictions, state residency status is not
known, so state income taxes are not calculated.
Marginal tax rates are very important in determining the value of medical
insurance to a worker. Marginal Federal income tax rates can be as large as 41% in
the sample, while FICA marginal tax rates are typically 15%. For some individuals,
this means that only one half of the compensating differential would actually be
received.
The theoretical model emphasized that households are collectively making
medical insurance decisions. After the first medical insurance plan, a second plan
has no value in a static setting. The theory provides no immediate intuition on
choosing to whom to assign the value of insurance among multiple wage-earners in
a household.
Three criteria could be used as a proxy for this assignment. The first chooses
the worker in the household with the lowest wage. Suppose the two workers in a
household earn wages wh and wl, where wh > wl. If all medical insurance plans are
perfectly substitutable, then a household would choose insurance from the low-wage
job, since it costs less: $wl < $wh. This is not entirely satisfying, since it may be
assigning the value of medical insurance to workers only marginally attached to the
labor force. (I.e., the opportunity cost of leaving the job, the total compensation of
the job, is higher for the household member with the higher wage.)
A second criterium chooses the worker in the household with the highest
wages. If there are differences among medical insurance plans, then the one that
costs more is likely to be the more generous, and thus preferred, one. This worker
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is also likely to be more attached to the labor force.
A third criterium selects the worker designated as the “head of household.”
In the MEPS, the head of household is the member who owns or pays rent the
home. However, a substantial fraction of the heads of household are unemployed,
suggesting that it mis-measures the object in question: which household member is
the preferred source of private medical insurance. A household member who is not
strongly attached to the labor force would not be preferred, because the coverage
would go away when the member left the labor force. Because of this, the second
criteria is used.
The data distinguish single coverage from family coverage. Ideally, these
coverage types would be separated, and the value of each medical insurance plan
could depend upon the household members it covers. However, the estimates of
Olson (2002) do not distinguish between single and family plans. Olson’s (2002)
estimates are used to pin down sensible CRRA coefficients. The distribution, and
the number of households who choose medical insurance, imply a compensating
differential. If the implied compensating differentials are similar to those in Olson
(2002), then the range of CRRA coefficients is correct.
The sample is pared down using the following criteria: the job must pay at
least the federally mandated minimum wage, for over thirty hours a week. The
employee must be between the ages of twenty-two and sixty-two, in order to avoid
complications due to parental insurance or Medicare.
Two methods are used to fit the empirical distribution. The first is a non-
parametric kernel density estimation. The second assumes that the insurance premia
are distributed log-normally. The empirical distributions, as well as the two fits
for each, are shown in Figure 2.3. Each of the subfigures corresponds to whether
the condition profile is known (“fitted”) or estimated (“forecast”), and a CRRA
coefficient of one, two or three.
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As Figure 2.3 indicates, both of these methods produce similarly fitted dis-
tributions. Elasticities for the estimated non-parametric distributions can be found
in Table 2.5.
The lognormal assumption allows for estimating a variance of the elasticity.
For a lognormal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ, the elasticity
is determined by:
L =
$
σ
(
φln(
$−µ
σ )
Φln(
$−µ
σ )
), (2.8)
where φln and Φln are the PDF and CDF of the lognormal distribution. The stan-
dard error of the elasticity is calculated using the delta method. Since $ and
Φln(
$−µ
σ ) are known, the variance in the estimates µ̂ and σ̂ lead to variance in the
estimated elasticity in the first term of Equation (2.8), and the numerator of the
second. This leads to the variance of the estimated elasticity:
V ar(L) ≈ [ V ar(µ̂) V ar(σ̂) ]
[
( ∂∂µ)
2
( ∂∂σ )
2
]
= V ar(µ̂) ∗
(
$φ′ln(
$−µ̂
σ̂ )
σ̂2Φln(
$−µ̂
σ̂ )
)2
+ V ar(σ̂) ∗
(
$
σ̂2Φln(
$−µ̂
σ̂ )
[φln(
$ − µ̂
σ̂
) +
$ − µ̂
σ̂
φ′ln(
$ − µ̂
σ̂
)]
)2
.
The estimated variances, along with their point estimates, can be found
in Table 2.4. The approximation is allowed because the covariances between the
estimates of µ̂ and σ̂ are very small (on the order of 10−20). Since µ̂ and σ̂ are
distributed normally, the estimates of L are distributed normally.
The estimates of the elasticities and their 95% confidence intervals are all
between one and two. The estimates are larger when the condition profile is fore-
casted. The difference in the lognormal fits is due primarily to the differences in
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their estimated σ̂’s.
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As mentioned, comparing the implied compensating differentials to the ones
found in Olson (2002) is a way to evaluate different coefficients of relative risk
aversion. If the estimation of insurance premia when condition profile is known
underestimates the value of medical insurance, then a CRRA coefficient of three is
too large. Likewise, if the forecasting method overestimates the insurance premia,
then a CRRA coefficient of one is too small. This suggests that a CRRA coefficient
around two is best.
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Figure 2.2: Distributions of Insurance Premia, by CRRA Coefficient and Estimation
Procedure.
2.3.1 Changing the Tax Code
The estimates ̂ and ̂L suggest how minor tax reforms will change the market supply
for jobs without private medical insurance. What would happen if these changes
were major? What would happen if private medical insurance were taxed at the
same rate as wages, subject to Federal income and FICA taxes?
One result of the theoretical model is that taxing firms’ expenditure on pri-
vate medical insurance has different results than taxing the workers. If the workers
are taxed at their marginal rate, τ = φmi , then there is no longer a subsidy of pri-
vate medical insurance through the compensating differential, and pi(z˜i) = pi(z˜i). If
r = 2 and condition profiles are known (“fitted”), roughly half of the workers in
the sample would choose to forgo private medical insurance, doubling the number
of uninsured workers.
If firms are taxed, then there is still some subsidization. In order to reflect this
proposed tax scheme, the after-tax insurance premia are pi′(z˜i) =
pi(z˜i)
1+φmi
. The effects
here are less dramatic, as theory suggests. Using the same distribution as before,
roughly 37% of the workers would choose to forgo medical insurance, compared to
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one quarter in the current scheme. These effects are large, but so are the marginal
tax rates. It should not be surprising to see such large changes when ad valorem
subsidies as large as fifty percent are removed.
2.4 Review
Previous attempts to measure the effect of Federal tax law on the private medical in-
surance choices of workers have focused on the price elasticity for individual workers.
Their results are interpreted as measuring the effects on the intensive margin—how
does the average worker’s propensity to have private medical insurance adjust as the
marginal tax rate adjusts? Measures on the intensive margin are less conceptually
appealing for discrete choices.
The more pressing policy question is: how many workers will forgo private
medical insurance if we end the subsidization of private medical insurance. This
chapter provides a framework to address the extensive margin. The procedures
described above can be used to estimate demand curves for any kind of insurance.
This chapter also finds that the distortions of US income taxes are very large.
The number of workers without private medical insurance would increase by half if
it were taxed as income. Other tax-exempt workplace benefits and amenities are
likewise overconsumed. Tax-exempt income sources are subject to these distortions,
as well.
This chapter finds that removing the tax subsidy of private medical insurance
would lead to large changes in the number of workers with private medical insurance.
Such changes would likely lead to an increased cost of private medical insurance.
Thus, the estimates of the market elasticity provided here are lower-bound measures
of the true effects.
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Table 2.1: Estimates for the Heckit procedure: probability of conditions on private
HI expenditure
Expenditure 1==Insured
Est. SE Est. SE
Age .4731921 .8205193 .0513394 .0064774
Age2 .0018056 .0100435 -.0004966 .0000849
1==Male 29.29986 19.06743 .1848905 .165913
Age*Male -1.61748 1.039742 -.0090381 .0093571
Age2*Male .0175994 .0132971 .0001475 .0001223
Hypertension 22.95935 3.38623 -.0261127 .034318
Lipid Disorder 18.06541 4.65352 .3438363 .0490877
Pregnancy 49.5938 5.060971 -.2032856 .0388463
Diabetes 49.68642 5.717271 -.3631525 .0464548
Psychol. 24.24095 3.244273 -.1649887 .0283652
Cancer 61.32173 4.782201 .3551595 .0507559
Sinusitis 3.402318 4.523483 .388404 .0452294
Allergies 3.835251 3.865903 .36683 .0349636
Other 23.52663 3.678306 .3518505 .0214878
Family Condition — — .2411545 .0347603
Constant -17.81937 22.53788 -.9659483 .116528
λ -1.36691 14.25534
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Table 2.2: Individual’s Condition Profile Estimates
Hypertension Lipid Disorder Pregnancy
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Age -.000953 .0008463 .0023785 .0006845 -.0187346 .0005112
1==Male -.0190249 .0549945 -.2119737 .0444801 -.49255 .0332186
Age2 .0001092 8.50e-06 .000019 6.87e-06 .0001372 5.13e-06
Age*Male .0008904 .0012756 .0020081 .0010318 .0189609 .0007705
Age2*Male -.0000181 .000013 -.0000178 .0000105 -.0001393 7.87e-06
1==Smoker -.007327 .0053122 -.008966 .0042965 -.0076054 .0032087
BMI .0143962 .0011824 .0061929 .0009564 .0056277 .0007142
BMI2 -.0000643 .0000161 -.0000467 .0000131 -.0000521 9.75e-06
BMI*Male -.0008596 .0032731 .0107651 .0026474 -.0068733 .0019771
BMI2*Male .0000342 .0000505 -.0001478 .0000409 .0000718 .0000305
1==Asian -.0511157 .0196008 .0531056 .0158533 -.0095594 .0118395
1==Black -.0473304 .0118781 .0234137 .0096071 -.0011316 .0071748
1==Other Race -.0763052 .0060195 .0367693 .0048686 .0040515 .003636
1==Hispanic -.008574 .0053032 -.0373988 .0042892 .0104963 .0032033
Constant -.2964054 .0267183 -.2205474 .02161 .5027256 .0161388
R2 0.23 0.09 0.17
Diabetes Psychological Disorder Cancer
Age .0006915 .0006223 .0077592 .0008543 .0025836 .000613
1==Male .0749468 .0404434 .2108511 .0555165 .0301009 .0398364
Age2 .0000279 6.25e-06 -.0000672 8.58e-06 -7.17e-06 6.15e-06
Age*Male .0000234 .0009381 -.0050546 .0012878 -.0057194 .000924
Age2*Male 4.49e-06 9.59e-06 .0000511 .0000132 .0000714 9.44e-06
1==Smoker -.0048522 .0039066 .0675008 .0053626 -.0204152 .003848
BMI .0103229 .0008696 .0064283 .0011937 -.0000613 .0008565
BMI2 -.0000544 .0000119 -.0000358 .0000163 -5.45e-06 .0000117
BMI*Male -.0060933 .0024071 -.0113827 .0033042 .0024407 .002371
BMI2*Male .0001046 .0000372 .0001518 .000051 -.0000299 .0000366
1==Asian -.0032603 .0144145 .0869442 .0197868 .0115296 .0141982
1==Black -.0165615 .0087352 -.0299766 .0119908 -.0053294 .0086041
1==Other Race -.0429732 .0044267 .0503595 .0060766 .0422633 .0043603
1==Hispanic .0307456 .0039 -.0501532 .0053535 -.0451661 .0038415
Constant -.2314491 .0196488 -.1988932 .0269719 -.0363606 .019354
R2 0.09 0.04 0.05
Sinusitis Allergies Other
Age .003931 .0005764 .0063144 .0007343 .0019051 .0009644
1==Male .0343906 .0374582 .0614089 .0477159 .0119447 .0626755
Age2 -.0000431 5.79e-06 -.0000658 7.37e-06 7.40e-06 9.68e-06
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Age*Male -.0022962 .0008689 -.0056759 .0011068 -.0026693 .0014538
Age2*Male .0000218 8.88e-06 .0000548 .0000113 .0000474 .0000149
1==Smoker -.0035772 .0036182 -.0343774 .0046091 .0204546 .0060541
BMI .0023497 .0008054 .0026359 .0010259 .0088428 .0013476
BMI2 -.0000247 .000011 -.0000202 .000014 -.0000676 .0000184
BMI*Male -.0007219 .0022294 .0018062 .0028399 -.0082088 .0037303
BMI2*Male 3.01e-06 .0000344 -.0000317 .0000439 .0001505 .0000576
1==Asian .0127106 .0133506 .0248955 .0170066 .0599365 .0223384
1==Black -.020154 .0080904 .0335193 .010306 -.0392999 .013537
1==Other Race .0405918 .0041 .0445266 .0052228 .105774 .0068602
1==Hispanic -.062902 .0036121 -.045784 .0046013 -.1639062 .0060438
Constant -.06515 .0181985 -.0921705 .0231821 .5056103 .03045
R2 0.02 0.02 0.09
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Table 2.4: Estimates for the Heckit procedure: probability of conditions on private
HI expenditure
Expenditure 1==Insured
Est. SE Est. SE
Pr(Hypertension) -56.83501 53.4025 2.553709 .540297
Pr(Lipid Disorder) -123.3155 49.30362 3.713421 .4960758
Pr(Pregnancy) -17.04967 23.93567 -1.291404 .2366441
Pr(Diabetes) 276.0879 100.3699 -7.469384 1.018011
Pr(Psychol.) -24.45859 38.87041 -5.137798 .4000075
Pr(Cancer) 193.5422 90.33039 -5.836164 .924048
Pr(Sinusitis) -138.3407 165.5682 2.237323 1.774985
Pr(Allergies) -35.54377 76.15171 5.58042 .8294379
Pr(Other) 160.0056 71.16331 4.157687 .7354532
Family Condition — — -.2576775 .1494431
Constant -82.60812 41.94979 -2.322584 .4255944
λ -1.420048 4.331656
Table 2.5: Elasticity of labor supply relative to compensating differential
Method CRRA CDF PDF $ Elasticity
Fitted 1 25 2.29975 .145 1.33
2 25 1.89123 .175 1.32
3 25 1.62837 .200 1.30
Forecast 1 25 1.99005 .173 1.38
2 25 1.46049 .220 1.29
3 25 1.16261 .262 1.22
Table 2.6: The CDF is taken from the data, as the percentage of jobs in the sample
without private medical insurance. The PDF is determined from a kernel density
estimation of the empirical distribution values of private health insurance to the
household, as described in the text. $ is the implied compensating differential,
from that distribution and the CDF. The elasticity is calculated using the formula
from the text. The CRRA coefficients have been selected to: (1) sample a range of
sensible coefficients; and (2) yield implied $’s that fit previous empirical estimation.
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Method CRRA CDF $ µˆ (SE) σ̂ (SE) Elasticity (SE) Log(L)
Fitted 1 25 .145 -1.3711 (0.013) 0.87349 (0.009) 1.70 (0.0326) 408.059
2 25 .175 -1.14787 (0.013) 0.893281 (0.009) 1.60 (0.0302) -737.546
3 25 .200 -0.97989 (0.013) 0.919079 (0.010 ) 1.49 (0.0277) -1654.01
Forecast 1 25 .173 -1.1596 (0.014) 0.946801 (0.010) 1.46 (0.0304) -945.074
2 25 .220 -0.847513(0.015) 1.02158 (0.011 ) 1.24 (0.0264) -2738.7
3 25 .262 -0.623185(0.016) 1.07224 (0.011 ) 1.11 (0.0266) -4007.65
Table 2.7: The CDF is taken from the data, as the percentage of jobs in the sample
without private medical insurance. $ is the implied compensating differential. µˆ
and σ̂ are the mean and standard deviation of the fitted lognormal distribution,
respectively. The elasticity is provided, along with a standard error found using the
delta method and the variance-covariance matrix of µˆ and σ̂, as discussed in the
text. Log(L) is the log-likelihood of the fit.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Replacement Rates in
a Search Economy:
Endogenizing UI
The benefits and taxes of unemployment insurance (UI) vary greatly across admin-
istrative regions. This is commonly characterized by contrasting the US and the
more generous and costly European systems. As reported in Martin (1996), within
OECD Europe, replacement rates can vary from under thirty percent (Ireland), to
seventy percent or higher (Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland.) US UI
is administered on the state level, and varies accordingly. Gruber (1994) imputes
replacement rates for the PSID sample; replacement rates vary greatly across states,
with a secular decline in benefits over time.
One obvious reason—the reason which is the focus of this chapter— behind
these differences is variety in bargaining power across UI administrative regions.
Since the value of higher benefits come at the cost of diminished rent to be divided
between the firm and the employee, the optimal tax level balances lowered wages
for the employed with the consumption replacement for the unemployed.
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Given variety in benefit schedules, I posit a positive model of optimal re-
placement rates, designed to balance consumption of employment periods versus
consumption while unemployed. I consider why UI systems are different in their
generosity to the unemployed, at the cost of taxing the productive matches in an
economy.
Nash bargaining is used here to determine the wage of a filled vacancy. One
implication of Nash bargaining is that full insurance can only be achieved for some
values of the Nash bargaining parameter. This is because Nash bargaining aims
to maximize the surplus of a filled vacancy. If full insurance is achieved, then the
worker receives no surplus from employment, and the Nash surplus is zero.
When using Nash bargaining, it is common to assume the symmetric value,
β = 1/2, or one of two extreme values, β ∈ {0, 1}. Only a few estimates of β exist
in the literature, as the data demands for the estimation are severe.1
The second section of this chapter presents a simplified model economy, to
develop some intuition of the costs and benefits of a UI system, and the conditions
for UI optimality. The third section provides for the calibration of β. The fourth
section works with replacement rate data from the US to estimate β. The fifth
section concludes.
3.1 The Model
Consider a continuous-time labor search economy with a matching function of the
form m(u, v) = pu. That is, some fraction p of the unemployed agents in the
economy are matched with a vacancy. Thus, the probability of an unemployed
agent becoming employed is p(u, v) = m(u, v)/u = p , which is constant across
unemployment levels and vacancy rates. The probability that a vacancy is filled,
1Four examples of this estimation can be found in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006), Flinn
(2006), Abowd and Allain (1996) and Cahuc, Gianella, Goux and Zylberberg (2002). See the
calibration and estimation section for further discussion.
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q(u, v) = m(u, v)/v, can be written in terms of θ = v/(1− n), the ratio of vacancies
to unemployed: q(θ) = pθ−1.2
Filled vacancies create rent z. Filled vacancies are destroyed at an exogenous
rate of δ. There is a unit measure of agents, whose utility of consumption is governed
by a generic utility function u(·). The proportion of them unemployed is 1−n, while
n are employed.
3.1.1 Nash Bargaining with Non-Linear Utilities: Taxing the Firms
In this economy, I write continuous-time value functions for being employed at a
wage w and unemployed receiving benefits b, respectively
rVe = u(w + F ) + δ(Vu − Ve)
rVu = u(b+ F ) + p(Ve − Vu).
F is a lump-sum transfer given to each agent. For the firm, I have two value
functions: one for a filled vacancy at a wage w, and one for an unfilled vacancy,
respectively
rVf = (z − w − τ) + δ(Vv − Vf )
rVv = −c+ q(Vf − Vv).
Here, c is the cost of posting a vacancy. The firm is being taxed at some level τ ,
which is used to finance the U.I. system; this taxation is modeled as decreasing the
rent of a filled vacancy. The surplus for being employed for a worker can be solved
from above as
Ve − Vu = u(w + F )− u(b+ F )
r + δ + p
. (3.1)
2This is essentially the typical search model with a Cobb-Douglas matching function with the
matching elasticity set to η = 1.
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Free entry drives Vv → 0, so the surplus for a firm’s filled vacancy is
Vf =
z − w − τ
δ + r
. (3.2)
The Nash Bargaining wage is the wage which solves the following problem
w∗ = argmaxw
(
u(w + F )− u(b+ F )
r + δ + p
)β(
z − w − τ
r + δ
)1−β
. (3.3)
subject to two participation constraints: for the worker, w− b ≥ 0, and for the firm,
z − τ − w ≥ 0. These two constraints only bind in the extreme cases where β = 0
and β = 1, respectively. The Nash-bargaining wage is given by the equation
z − τ = w + 1− β
β
u(w + F )− u(b+ F )
u′(w + F )
. (3.4)
It is also useful to think about how the wage changes as the tax levels and
benefits change across steady-states. The steady-state conditions are:
nτ = (1− n)b (3.5)
F = nVf = n
z − w − τ
r + δ
(3.6)
nδ = (1− n)p. (3.7)
The first equation is a government-budget constraint: the “taxes in” equal the
“benefits out.” The second accounts for the lump-sum transfers to all agents, which
are paid for by the profits earned by the filled vacancies.3 The third ensures an
unchanging unemployment rate: the jobs destroyed equal the jobs created.
3This can be thought of as communal ownership of the firms through non-transferable stock, or
taxation of the firm by the government, which returns all of the value of the firm to the workers.
This is to account for the value of the firm in the optimization problem.
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The Implicit Function Theorem and (3.5) and (3.7) combine to yield
∂w
∂τ
= −
1− 1−ββ u
′(b+F )
u′(w+F )
p
δ
1 + 1−ββ
u′(w+F )2−u′′(w+F )[u(w+F )−u(b+F )]
u′(w+F )2
. (3.8)
The denominator is negative, and while the numerator is ambiguous in sign.
Theorem. ∂w∂τ < 0 iff
β >
p
δ
u′(b+F )
u′(w+F )
1 + pδ
u′(b+F )
u′(w+F )
. (3.9)
That is, if u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and an increase in benefits dramatically increases
the ratio of marginal utility of the benefits to marginal utility of the corresponding
wage, then the a tax increase could be associated with an increase in wages. The
Nash bargaining mechanism is behind this otherwise counterintuitive result: because
the worker is doing better while unemployed, maximizing weighed surplus requires
increasing the reward of being employed—that is, increasing the wage. This, of
course, is dependent upon ∂b∂τ = p/δ, which is pinned down according to the two
steady-state conditions and the exogenous probability p.
It is also instructive to consider the two extreme values of β. When β = 1,
all of the surplus of the match goes to the worker. The participation constraint of
the firm4, z − w − τ ≥ 0, binds; thus w = z − τ . ∂w∂τ = −1. Since the wage is all of
the after-tax rent of the match, the wage decreases one-to-one as the tax increases.
When β = 0, the Nash bargaining wage is such that all of the surplus of
the match goes to the firm. The participation constraint of the worker is w ≥ b
(that is, the worker is at least indifferent to participate in the match, versus staying
unemployed). Thus, w = pδ τ .
∂w
∂τ = p/δ. Since the wage is driven down to the
unemployment benefit, the wage increases as the tax increases.
The sign of ∂w∂τ also depends upon the curvature of the utility function.
4That is, the firm is at least indifferent to participate in the match
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ρ = b+Fw+F is the after-transfer replacement rate. For the CRRA utility function
parameterized by σ, u(w) = w
1−σ−1
1−σ , and a candidate replacement rate, ρ, I can
re-write the numerator of (3.8)as
1− 1− β
β
ρ−σ
p
δ
.
This allows us to see how the degree of risk aversion, the replacement rate and β
play a role in the sensitivity of the wage to taxes.
Since the taxes and benefits will be chosen to solve a maximization problem,
it is important to consider whether it is different to tax the firm, as described above,
or to tax the employed individual.
Theorem. If the tax burden is shifted from the firm, to the employed worker as a
lump-sum income tax, the wage increases by the level of the tax. I.e., the worker’s
after-tax wage returns to the level when taxes were paid by the firm.
Proof. I can consider an alternative tax system where the employee pays an “income
tax” of τ upon employment; this income tax pays for unemployment benefits. I can
re-write (3.4):
z = w +
1− β
β
u(w + F − τ)− u(b+ F )
u′(w + F − τ)
z − τ = w − τ + 1− β
β
u(w + F − τ)− u(b+ F )
u′(w + F − τ) .
Note that the function of w on the right-hand side of (3.10) is the same as the
right-hand side of (3.4), but shifted to the right by τ . The the left-hand side of
both equations is z − τ , so versus the wage determined by firm taxation, the wage
increases by τ to compensate.
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3.1.2 Firms and Free Entry
Free entry leads to Vv → 0 and determines the number of vacancies in the economy.
The vacancy rate is determined endogenously by:
v =
(1− n)p
r + δ
z − w − τ
c
(3.10)
This implies that z − w − τ ≥ 0.
Theorem. Free entry ensures that Vf ≥ 0.
Proof. The values of a vacancy and matched firm can be rearranged to get closed-
form values for Vf and Vv.
Vf = (r + δ − qδ
r + q
)−1(z − w − τ − δ
r + q
c)
Vv = (r + q − qδ
r + δ
)−1(−c+ q
r + q
(z − w − τ))
Vv = 0 implies z − w − τ − r+δq = 0. From this, the key inequality is:
r + δ
q
− δ
r + q
=
r2 + r(δ + q)
q(r + q)
> 0
The coefficient in front of c in (3.1) is smaller than it is in the free-entry condition,
so Vf > 0.
Alternatively, Vf = c/q > 0.
Theorem. The Firm’s participation constraint, Vf ≥ 0 is satisfied for all candidate
tax-benefit schedules that satisfy the agent’s participation constraint, w ≥ b.
Proof. From the Nash bargaining equation, I can write the value of the firm in terms
of the after-transfer replacement rate:
Vf =
1− β
β(r + δ)
u(w + F )− u(b+ F )
u′(w + F )
.
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This value is greater than zero so long as the after-transfer replacement rate is less
than or equal two zero.
3.1.3 Optimal Tax Rates
The closed-form value functions for being employed and unemployed are, respec-
tively
Ve =
1
r + δ − pδr+p
(u(w + F ) +
δ
r + p
u(b+ F ))
Vu =
1
r + p− pδr+δ
(u(b+ F ) +
p
r + δ
u(w + F )).
The generalized maximization problem faced by the government setting UI policy
is
max
τ
λVe + (1− λ)Vu, (3.11)
subject to the two government budget constraints(3.5and 3.6), the wage determi-
nation equation (3.4), and steady-state employment (3.7). λ is the relative weight
placed on the employed worker, 1 − λ for the unemployed worker. There are three
special cases:
• λ = 1, maximize the value of the employed; if n > .5, also a majoritarian rule;
• λ = 0, maximize the value of the unemployed; if n > .5, a maximin rule;
• λ = n, maximize the average utility in the economy.
The maximization problem for some λ can be written
max
τ
(λr + p)u(w + F ) + ((1− λ)r + δ)u(b+ F ) (3.12)
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The first-order condition in terms of τ is
(λr + p)(
∂w
∂τ
(1− p
(p+ δ)(r + δ)
)− p
(p+ δ)(r + δ)
)u′(w + F )
+((1− λ)r + δ)(p
δ
− p
(p+ δ)(r + δ)
(1 +
∂w
∂τ
))u′(b+ F ) = 0 (3.13)
holds for interior solutions, such that the pre-transfer replacement rate (defined by
ρ̂ = b/w) is between zero and one; or alternatively, that τ is between zero and the
tax level that accommodates full insurance.
Theorem. If wages are convex in taxes (i.e., ∂
2w
∂τ2
> 0), then the objective function
is concave in τ .
This result is derived simply from the second-order equation of the objective
function. The convexity of wages in taxes is not guaranteed throughout the param-
eter space. However, for when the convexity assumption is satisfied, some results
follow that add to the intuition of the problem. Below, there will be some discussion
of non-convexity, i.e., when there may be multiple τ that satisfy the (3.13), so that
I may order the preference across these τ .
The two corner solutions are when the replacement rate is either one or zero.
It is important to understand where in the parameter space a replacement rate of
one is optimal, since it virtually eliminates those spaces as possible estimated values,
as full replacement is not typically observed. Similarly, taxes for unemployment
insurance is observed to be larger than zero, so the parameter space where τ = 0
would be similarly ruled out.
Theorem. If wages are convex in taxes, the optimal tax level is τ = 0 if
u(w˜ + F˜ )
u(F˜ )
>
λr + p
(1− λ)r + δ
where w˜, F˜ are the wage and transfer when τ = 0.
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Proof. The value of the lump-sum transfer when τ = 0, F |τ=0, is determined by the
wage when τ = 0, which solves
z = w +
1− β
β
u( nr+δz + (1− nr+δ )w)− u( nr+δz + nr+δw)
u′(nδ z + (1− nδ )w)
.
Thus, F |τ=0 = nr+δ (z − w). Evaluation of (3.13) at τ = 0 yields constraints on β
that it be outside [0, 1] to maintain equality if the theorem’s inequality holds. Thus,
since β ∈ [0, 1], the optimal τ = 0.
As shown below, this condition will not likely hold, because p > 10δ for
most countries, and calibrated values of F are typically large. This is suggestive of
transfers playing a substantial role in the consumption of agents.
Theorem. If wages are convex in taxes, the optimal replacement rate is equal to
one if
β ≤ n(λr + p+ n) + ((2− λ)r + 2δ)n− n(1− n)(1 +
p
δ )
λr + p+ n
Proof. This inequality comes from evaluating (3.13) at ρ = 1; if this value is positive,
then the participation constraint of the worker binds.
For typical calibrations (see below) this implies that a β below .4 results in
a replacement rate of one. This is much less restrictive than when the value of the
firm is not rebated to the workers in a lump-sum fashion.
If Value of Firm is not returned to the Agents
If the value of the firm is not rebated to the agents, then it can be shown that if
β ≤ n = pp+δ , then the optimal UI policy would be full insurance.
Theorem. If β < 11+δ/p = n, then the optimal replacement rate is ρ
∗ = 1.
73
The first-order condition is
(λr + p)
∂w
∂ρ
u′(w) + ((1− λ)r + δ)(w + ρ∂w
∂ρ
)u′(ρw) ≥ 0. (3.14)
With F = 0, the wage rate can be determined purely in terms of the replacement
rate and other parameters:.
w =
z
1 + δpρ+
1−β
β
1−ρ1−σ
1−σ
. (3.15)
This condition holds with equality when ρ∗ ∈ (0, 1). However, if ∂w∂ρ |ρ=1≥ 0, then
ρ∗ = 1, since the participation constraint of both the firm and the worker bind. In
fact, these constraints bind for particular parameter values.
∂w
∂ρ
|ρ=1 =
−z δp + z 1−ββ ρ−σ
(1 + δpρ+
1−β
β (
1−ρ1−σ
1−σ ))
2
|ρ=1 =
z(1−ββ − δp)
(1 + δp)
2
. (3.16)
So, if β < 11+δ/p = n, then the optimal replacement rate is one. Since this is a a
condition that is likely to hold, it severely restricts the values of β that can lead to
replacement rates of less than one.
3.1.4 Non-Convex Objective Function
Theorem. If multiple τ satisfy (3.13) as maxima, then the optimal τ is the one
associated with the lowest F . Further, the lowest F is the associated with the largest
τ .
Proof. The total output of the economy is nz − cv. Since the only object in the
total output of the economy that moves according to the tax level is v, and it enters
negatively. v is increasing in z − w − τ , as is F , per (3.6). Thus, larger F means
more vacancies, and more output is spent on posting these vacancies, less is spent
on consumption.
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The second result stems from ∂F∂τ < 0.
∂F
∂τ
=
−n
r + δ
(
∂w
∂τ
+ 1).
If ∂w∂τ > −1, then ∂F∂τ < 0. From (3.8), ∂w∂τ = −1 only when ρ = 1 and β = 1, and is
larger for all other (ρ, β).
For the empirical discussion below, the first-order condition (3.13) is assumed
to hold, and hold with the highest τ . This is driven by two observations: first, that
the pre-transfer replacement rate (i.e., ρ̂, the one funded by τ) is observed to be
greater than zero, and less than one; and the operating assumption of this chapter,
that these UI policies are optimal.
3.2 Cross-Country Calibration
The construction of the model allows for cross-country calibrations of β, according
to varying optimal replacement rates. Previous estimations of bargaining power
are few, due mainly to the severe data demands. It is infrequent that firm-level
data includes enough information to estimate outside opportunities to firms and
employees, and thus the surplus accorded to the firms the employees. Abowd and
Allain (1996) and Cahuc et al. (2002) take advantage of French data sets with such
information, and estimate β to be within the range of .1 to .4. Here, I use the UI
replacement rates of different countries to find their corresponding βs, per the model
constructed. I also use the case where λ = 1, which the objective is to maximize
the value of the majority of agents—an employed agent.
The replacement rates for various nations as reported in Table 3.1 are drawn
from OECD (2004). At first glance, it may be surprising to see that the European
and American replacement rates are not very dissimilar. In particular, this contrasts
the tables reported in Martin (1996), later reproduced in Ljungqvist and Sargent
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(1998), which place US replacement rates at less than thirty percent. The numbers
reported here are the replacement rates for the initial phase of unemployment, while
Martin (1996) calculates the replacement rates for the first year of unemployment.
For example, in the United States, unemployment benefits typically last 26 weeks;
using administrative UI data, Meyer (1990) finds an average replacement rate of
66 percent over the span of eligibility—the duration of the unemployment spell, or
when benefits run out, whichever comes first. (In Meyer (1990), the spells average
just over thirteen weeks.)
OECD (2004) reports replacement rates for several wage levels relative to
mean, and household compositions. In terms of the theoretical model above, these
are the pre-transfer replacement rates, ρ̂ = b/w. The replacement rates used here
for calibration are for those earning the average wage, with no children. In several
U.S. states, extra benefits are allowed for recipients with one or more children. In
order to focus on the replacement of income, the replacement rates indicated will
be used.
Unemployment levels are used to calibrate for p. Steady-state conditions
imply 1 − n = δp+δ ; I assume a common δ, and back out a p from the unemploy-
ment rate for each country. To allow for different unemployment levels arising from
different labor market institutions beyond the scope of unemployment insurance,
I perform this calibration. δ is set so that the weekly employment hazard for a
worker is roughly ten percent, per evidence for the initial weeks of unemployment
in Meyer (1990). It could be said that the unemployment insurance scheme devised
here affects p directly, though a matching function with η < 1; that is p should
be endogenous to the tax scheme. This is an important extension, already being
modeled for future work.
It is also important to revisit Meyer (1990). While an important result de-
rived therein was the negative association between replacement rate and employment
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hazard, even more stunning was the even sharper increase in employment hazard
due to benefit exhaustion. As Table 3.1 suggests, the difference in replacement rates
between the US and Europe is not large. The important difference between the US
and Europe is the duration of benefits; for many European systems, benefits exhaust
in years, not weeks. If the availability of benefits are reflected in higher levels of
unemployment rate, it will be because of a lower probability of employment, p.
The wages presented are the average wage for a production (non-white collar)
worker in each country, as reported in OECD (2004). They are denominated in
2002 US dollars, converted with the OECD’s purchasing parity parities (PPP).
Productivity level, z, for each country is derived from the labor share of each country;
i.e., zc = slcwc. The labor shares are also from the OECD, reported for each country.
From these, I find the lump-sum transfer, F , for each country.
β1C and β
1.5
C are the calibrated values of Nash bargaining, for log- and CRRA
coefficient of 1.5 utility, respectively. The smallest Nash bargaining weight consistent
with replacement rate of less than one is reported as β1. The implied after-transfer
replacement rate is reported as ρ.
The largest calibrated Nash bargaining weights can be found in the low-
employment, generous-benefits countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark.
Ungenerous Ireland also has a large estimated Nash bargaining weight for workers.
Countries with large unemployment rates are seen as having lower bargaining pow-
ers. For the Canada, using the symmetric Nash bargaining value of β = .5 is not
terribly far off from calibrations of .53. The French value of .45 is similar to Abowd
and Allain (1996), who estimated a Nash bargaining power of .4 in French firms.
The US and the United Kingdom have similar average wage levels and unem-
ployment. They differ, however, in their replacement rates, with the US replacing
more income than the United Kingdom. Bargaining power in the US is calculated
to be lower than in the United Kingdom. Because wages in the US are less sensitive
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to taxes than in the United Kingdom, optimal pre-transfer replacement rates are
higher.
The unemployment rates, through the employment hazard, drive a lot of the
Nash bargaining calibrations. High unemployment rates make it relatively more
expensive to increase unemployment benefits. E.g., a country with five-percent
unemployment gets an extra 19 units of benefits for a tax increase of one unit, while
a country with ten-percent unemployment gets just over half of that (10) for the
same increase in tax. Thus, in order to finance the higher replacement rates on
wages (i.e., pre-transfer replacement rate), the worker should be less sensitive to the
effects of those taxes on wages.
The calculated after-transfer replacement rates are all very close to full re-
placement. This is because the values of the firms are very large, due to the small
values for r and δ; thus, the size of F dominates the the pre-transfer replacement
rate, ρ̂, in determining the after-transfer replacement rate ρ.
3.3 GMM Estimations
For individual i, with employment hazard pi, receiving benefits b according to pre-
viously earned wage w, the optimal replacement rate satisfies:
(λr + pi)(
∂w
∂τ
(1− p
(p+ δ)(r + δ)
)− p
(p+ δ)(r + δ)
)u′(w + F )
+((1− λ)r + δ)(p
δ
− p
(p+ δ)(r + δ)
(1 +
∂w
∂τ
))u′(b+ F ) = 0. (3.17)
UI benefit level calculations include the wage level of the previous job, and more
infrequently, number of children and marital status (as a matter of needs, not affect-
ing employment hazard). However, as equation (3.17) suggests, any variable which
effects pi should be included in the calculation. Individual characteristics such as
age, race, education, children and marital status have significant effects on employ-
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ment hazard, though they are not accounted for in replacement rates. Equation
(3.17) should equal zero on average; however, since individual employment hazards
(pi) vary around the average unemployment level (p), there is a systematic error
structure. Since pi occurs linearly in (3.17), the expectation across i is zero.
It is important to differentiate between p and pi. Where p occurs, it appears
through the government budget constraint, (3.5), or steady-state employment level
and level of lump-sum benefits, (3.7, 3.6). As pi varies across individuals, it does not
shift the economy’s employment level, or, concomitantly, the amount of lump-sum
transfers, or how benefits move in response to changes in taxes (i.e., ∂b∂τ = p/δ =
n/(1− n)).
Variance in pi lead to variance in optimal replacement rates through the value
functions of the employed and unemployed agents. For example, if one individual
had a very low probability of leaving unemployment, their replacement rate would
be higher than a high-probability. Again, since there are a large number of agents
in the economy, that heterogeneity in employment hazards does not change the
unemployment level, and thus the government budget constraint.
3.3.1 The Data
The data used here come from “An Analysis of UI Recipients’ Unemployment
Spells,” a report from the Upjohn Institute. The wage and benefit levels are re-
ported from a sample of the Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH), which
is a collection of UI benefit records. Observations are recipients from Missouri and
Pennsylvania, whose benefit receipt began between October 1979 and March 1980.
Further information was collected via phone and mail surveys one year later.5
The sample means are provided in Table (3.2). The average replacement rate
constructed here is lower than in other reported samples, due to its construction.
5A similar sample was used in Meyer (1990).
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The data report reliable weekly benefits given to the unemployed worker. Here, the
wage that is being replaced is the highest quarterly income of the previous year of
employment, rather than some average wage over that span, since UI benefit levels
are typically calculated from the high-quarter earnings. The average duration of
unemployment is just longer than 15 weeks. Due to data collection issues described
in Upjohn (1983), African Americans are under-represented in the sample.
The hazard estimations are provided in Table (3.3). These estimates are
from a parametric hazard estimation, assuming a constant baseline hazard, per the
parametric assumptions of the model (i.e., that p does not change over the duration
of the unemployment spell). These are the coefficients that will be used to construct
the individual-specific employment hazards in the GMM estimation. The estimates
are typical of the unemployment literature—the coefficients on age, education and
the African-American dummy are negative, thus decreasing the probability of re-
employment. Having a spouse in the household who works decreases the probability
of re-employment. The coefficients on number of dependents, the married dummy,
and number of weeks on previous job are all positive. Only the African-American and
married dummies and weeks in previous job are statistically significantly different
from zero.
The empirical survival function is presented in Figure 3.4. Its smooth, down-
ward slope is consistent with an exponential survivor function, the parametric as-
sumption made on the employment hazard.
3.3.2 A Simple Estimation Procedure
For a simple initial procedure, β was identified using equation (3.17) with the es-
timated p̂i from the hazard estimation; λ is set to one. Average wage and benefit
level were used; the productivity of a match was calculated by dividing the wage by
the labor share of the US. Here, I used the standard .67. δ was calculated from the
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average pi, and the average unemployment rates of Missouri and Pennsylvania from
1979-81 for this time, weighted by population. Unfortunately, the annual unemploy-
ment rates for these states at these times vary, per a business cycle downturn. The
average unemployment over this period was 7.34%. The unemployment levels in-
creased between 1979 and 1980, but stayed constant between 1980 and 1981. These
latter two years is when many of these unemployed started to look for work. (The
earliest observations have benefits start late 1979.)
The Nash bargaining estimates, provided in Table 3.4 are lower for this esti-
mation than the calibration for the US above. Per the discussion of in the calibration
section, this is likely because of the higher unemployment rate in this time period,
than for the calibration exercise, which is based on the year 2002.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter constructs a model with implications replacement rate optimality.
From these optimality conditions, I estimate parameters of the model—in particular,
the Nash bargaining weight for the worker. Cross-country calibration matches one
of the few estimations of the Nash bargaining weight, for France. Variance in US
employment hazards according to observable characteristics, not used for calculation
of UI benefits, are used to estimate the Nash bargaining weight via GMM.
Future extensions will allow for a more sophisticated GMM procedure, allow-
ing for estimation of other parameters (e.g., the CRRA coefficint), and incorporate
more of the rich set of data available from the Upjohn Institute.
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Table 3.1: Calibrated Nash Bargaining Weights, by Country
Country ρ̂ Avg. Wage Unemp. sL β1C β
1.5
C β1 ρ
Australia 32 36,3380 6.4 65.9 0.6309 0.6329 0.3940 0.9864
Belgium 66 34,6910 7.3 67.7 0.5613 0.5625 0.3762 0.9920
Canada 64 31,6270 7.7 73.6 0.5343 0.5360 0.3686 0.9883
Denmark 59 36,1920 4.6 66.0 0.7796 0.7806 0.4349 0.9918
Finland 64 28,6370 9.1 67.8 0.4462 0.4474 0.3434 0.9911
France 71 24,4180 8.9 69.3 0.4574 0.4585 0.3469 0.9921
Germany 61 34,3260 8.7 66.5 0.4694 0.4707 0.3504 0.9911
Greece 46 16,8140 10.0 70.7 0.4003 0.4022 0.3280 0.9848
Ireland 29 25,4270 4.3 76.9 0.8087 0.8115 0.4429 0.9763
Italy 52 25,9520 9.0 69.9 0.4530 0.4547 0.3452 0.9871
Japan 63 29,6050 5.4 70.6 0.7117 0.7130 0.4156 0.9905
Netherlands 71 33,2030 2.7 68.9 0.9287 0.9291 0.4967 0.9936
Portugal 78 12,7750 5.0 76.5 0.7453 0.7464 0.4250 0.9920
Spain 70 22,0250 11.3 71.8 0.3408 0.3420 0.3064 0.9898
United Kingdom 45 31,8310 5.1 76.7 0.7397 0.7422 0.4226 0.9810
United States 56 32,3600 5.8 75.0 0.6796 0.6817 0.4067 0.9856
δ = 0.0035, r = .0055
Table 3.2: Sample Means
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Age 36.16691 13.54362 1 79
Base Income 3321.259 1907.502 0 19303
Replacement Rate 0.4660421 0.1550094 .0776801 3.148148
Yrs. Education 11.50519 1.976167 2 17
No. Dependents 0.9861728 1.256134 0 8
1=Black 0.0474074 0.2125612 0 1
1=Married 0.6474074 0.4778952 0 1
Weeks Unemployed 15.13037 14.81603 1 80
Weeks in Prev. Job 30.82222 16.95705 0 222
1=Spouse Works 0.4103704 0.4920224 0 1
N = 2025
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Table 3.3: Hazard Estimation
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z|
Age -.0010355 .0018564 -0.56 0.577
Yrs. Educ -.0065146 .0118219 -0.55 0.582
No. Depend. .009289 .0191878 0.48 0.628
1=Black -.2557928 .1069428 -2.39 0.017
1=Married .1475432 .0653164 2.26 0.024
Weeks in Pre. Job .0150137 .0006102 24.61 0.000
1=Spouse Works -.0029573 .0561383 -0.05 0.958
Constant -3.060832 .1757327 -17.42 0.000
N = 2025
Kaplan−Meier survival estimate
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0 20 40 60 80
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
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Table 3.4: GMM Estimates for β, by CRRA Coefficient
σ 1 1.5 2 2.5
β̂ .5760 .5780 .5800 .5821
V (β̂) .0040 .0040 .0040 .0040
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